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Introduction—Emergency as a Disjuncture Between Discourse and Reality 
As a mode of discourse that calls for a particular, routine procedure in response to a 
perceived health threat, the concept of emergency appears frequently in global health parlance as 
a method of distilling order from intrinsically complex environments. According to the World 
Health Organization (WHO), an “emergency” describes a “state” which “requires threshold 
values to be recognized”, and which “demands to ‘be declared’ or imposed by someone in 
authority, who, at a certain moment, will also lift it” (“Definitions: Emergencies.”). For the 
WHO, an emergency seems dependent on numerical figures that render certain conditions in 
affected countries acute enough to constitute a temporary event, discernible against a messy 
reality, that merits attention and intervention. In the WHO’s emergency classification system, a 
Grade 3 emergency, the most severe, refers to “a single or multiple country event with 
substantial public health consequences that requires a substantial World Customs Organization 
response and/or substantial international WHO response” (“Emergencies”). This conception 
suggests a degree of arbitrariness and subjectivity behind the WHO’s ranking system, which 
appears shared with the concept of the Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
(PHEIC), the organization’s highest-level emergency at an international scale: “an extraordinary 
event…that is serious, unusual or unexpected, carries implications for public health beyond the 
affected State’s national border, and may require immediate international action” 
(“IHR…(PHEIC)”). Formally declared by the WHO six times in the past decade, the PHEIC has 
from its beginning been shaped by decisionist processes that are politically subjective: what 
diseases deserve research and emergency preparations priority, and to what extent are wealthier 
nations obligated to poorer ones in PHEIC situations (Lakoff 2016)? 
 
Despite the equivocal and still unresolved nature of these questions, the PHEIC has 
provided a welcomed sense of predictability and control in an era permeated by great uncertainty 
surrounding the emergence of new and known infectious diseases. The declaration of a PHEIC in 
2016 in response to Zika virus in the Americas, which until its appearance was largely unknown 
to scientific communities, represented the process of “assimilating [it]...into a more general form, 
making it comprehensible and potentially manageable” (Lakoff 2). This example shows how the 
notion of emergency, borne out of the language of dread inhering within global health security, 
has become, rather than a description of reality, a discursive tool of typically wealthier, and 
mostly Western nations to gain control over a threat: Lakoff (2016) describes the technical and 
administrative measures encompassed by a Global Health Emergency (GHE) response as those 
which “function to constitute a given situation as an emergency, one that requires an urgent and 
rapid collective response” (6). This process of transforming a reality into an emergency is 
significant, as it signifies a potential disjuncture between the response mobilized and reality, an 
incongruence between the procedures that ought to work and the situation that is, between the 
perspectives of those who envision PHEIC procedures as a quick fix and those on-the-ground 
facing inherently complex issues. 
Illustrative of this disconnect was the 2014-16 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in 
the Mano River Union (MRU) countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, better understood 
when placed into the historical context of the virus since its relatively recent discovery. First 
recognized by the Western scientific community in 1976 near a river in the DRC after which it 
was named, EVD is a virulent hemorrhagic fever with a case fatality ratio (CFR) of 50-90%1 
 
1 By comparison, the figure for the SARS outbreak in mainland China in 2002-2003 was 9.6% (WHO 2004, cited in 
Hewlett and Hewlett 2008), while the worldwide average mortality rate of Covid-19 as of April 2020 is about 3.4% 
(Adhanom-Ghebreyesus 2020).  
 
existing in several species or subtypes. The novelty and danger associated with this disease 
spurred a “Super-Ebola” simulation exercise in Honolulu in 1989 aimed at assessing the world’s 
capacity to respond to a global pandemic of Ebola, which jumpstarted the formation of the 
GOARN and establishment of a governance framework for GHEs2 (Lakoff 145). Yet Lakoff 
(2016) argues that the general lack of large-scale Ebola outbreak until that which occurred in 
West Africa shifted the international community’s impression of the virus from one of 
catastrophic potential to a manageable one namely affecting marginalized, rural communities, 
which helps explain the world’s slow reaction to the outbreak in West Africa in the mid-2010s3. 
Thus when WHO finally sounded the alarm through declaring the outbreak a PHEIC, it 
confronted the consequences of its global health governance paradigm in poorer countries, where 
the prioritization of disease surveillance system development had made minimal improvements 
in underdeveloped healthcare systems (Walsh and Johnson 2018). The activated GHE response 
machinery would be disadvantaged from the start, having failed to account for a non-robust 
health infrastructure as well as local distrust of health authorities and the state. 
With a death toll of 11,325 and a CFR of around 39%, the Ebola outbreak in West Africa 
would bring a renewed attention to the imperative of community engagement from the outset of 
 
2 As Heymann et al. (2019) explain, the widespread availability of portable satellite telephones and video link-ups 
by 1995 allowed the transfer of images from journalists and camera crews arriving in Kikwit soon after the Ebola 
epidemic was announced; these technological capacities contrasted with those that existed during the previous major 
outbreaks on scientific record that occurred in the late 1970s, where representatives of the news media were absent. 
Subsequent representations of Ebola in Western media gave it connotations combining fear and exoticism: 
microbiologist Richard Preston’s book The Hot Zone: The Terrifying Story of the True Origins of the Ebola Virus 
(1995), journalist Laurie Garrett’s The Coming Plague (1994), and the film Outbreak (1995) starring Dustin 
Hoffman have all served to highly dramatize the virus through depicting first encounters with it (Hewlett and 
Hewlett 2008). 
3 Previous, isolated outbreaks were mostly successfully contained via the WHO’s general approach: (1) isolation of 
infected cases (2) health education to inform the public about symptoms and modes of transmission (3) limitation of 
dangerous activities, such as unsafe burials of the deceased, and (4) contact tracing to identify and follow those who 
have had contact with the infected for 21 days, the virus’ incubation period (Hewlett and Hewlett 2008). 
 
an emergency response to address local mistrust4 (CDC, 2019). As Abramowitz (2017) writes, 
the response was beset by strategic mistakes made early on that perpetuated its “structural 
disconnect” with social mobilization, leading to tensions between response agendas and 
protocols on one side, and the overlooked priorities and practices of affected communities on the 
other. African burial practices, which consist of touching the deceased and which were 
militaristically repressed due to the heightened contagiousness of dead Ebola victims, were 
presented as bizarre and backward in some Western media reports, while pathological accounts 
of “community resistance” were equally produced (Pellecchia et al. 2015); these perspectives 
homogenized complex communities while also presenting locals’ efforts to conceal sick cases, 
and at times perpetrate attacks against elements of the response apparatus, as irrational and 
indicative of Africans’ proclivity toward violence (Fairhead 2016). Important work by 
anthropologists helped counter the reductive and stigmatizing narratives these terms perpetuated 
through researching the ways in which individuals’ lived experiences with the state can be 
implicated in different patterns of social “resistance” seen in this outbreak (Wilkinson and 
Fairhead 2016). Critical information gleaned from what went awry in gaining individuals’ trust 
informed recommendations to prioritize community engagement from the start of a response 
through ensuring that listening, empathy, and the facilitation when possible of local ownership 
not be dispensed for rapid, urgent containment efforts that privilege security over public health 
and basic rights (Walsh and Johnson 2018).  
Yet in reform efforts after the outbreak, all fingers pointed to the WHO’s strategic failure 
after the major epidemic, advising that “WHO must substantially strengthen and modernize its 
 
4 This notion of mistrust had surfaced in previous Ebola outbreaks in Gabon and the Republic of Congo, leading to 
some violent attacks against HCWs; here, Western medical anthropologists recruited by the WHO ultimately proved 
effective in engaging with communities through understanding their perspectives and also identifying ways to 
reconcile and combine Western and non-Western medical paradigms (Formenty et al. 2003; Epelboin et al. 2007). 
 
emergency management capacity”: notably, the organization’s approach to emergencies would 
be rationalized “through one set of emergency management processes and performance metrics 
that will be standard across the organization” (“Ensuring…Emergencies”, cited in Lakoff 
(2016)). In other words, the same emergency response machinery that had been profoundly 
misaligned with local conditions in the MRU countries and hindered the response would undergo 
a uniformization and centralization, one which would have implications for the next Ebola 
“emergency” (Lakoff 2016). 
 The top-down, security-driven emergency paradigm would quickly witness the 
consequences of its disjuncture with reality in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu and 
Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where an 18-month Ebola outbreak has 
encountered significant levels of local distrust. Declared as a Grade 3 emergency on August 1, 
2018 and formally defined as a PHEIC nearly a year later on July 17, 2019, this ongoing Ebola 
outbreak as of April 19, 2020 has caused 2,242 deaths and had a CFR of 66%. Negative reactions 
from local community members to the presence of Ebola and the riposte have manifested since 
the beginning of the declaration in ways that parallel those seen in West Africa: the hiding of 
sick loved ones, avoidance of the Ebola Treatment Center (ETC) and response workers, and 
verbal threats and deadly physical attacks against ETCs, healthcare workers (HCWs), and 
humanitarian convoys. These forms of “resistance” have been conveyed in media and scholarly 
discourse with a pathologizing hue reminiscent of that seen in West Africa: framed as 




6 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/world/africa/ebola-outbreak-congo.html  
 
events transpiring around them have been presented as products of their “ignorance”7, and their 
problematic “beliefs”8 and lack of education, thus emphasizing their irrationality. Yet as 
Alcayna-Stevens (2020) notes, these stigmatizing tones have shifted to a more investigative 
journalistic approach, examining the many alternative explanations for Ebola and the response 
provided by civilians that underpin their distrust; recurrent narratives present Ebola as a business 
to enrich the government, local elites, and foreign workers, and as a political tool of the 
government to exterminate populations in the affected provinces and/or to gain legitimacy. 
These various forms of “resistance” toward the riposte, when placed back into their 
proper historical and sociopolitical contexts, reveal the fundamental disconnect between the 
constructed emergency response and lived realities of emergency of the populations affected. As 
a region profoundly shaped by the legacies of imperial, colonial and postcolonial violence that 
turned it into a warlord regime with an absence of state authority, it would become embroiled in 
the Congo Wars from 1996-2003 during which time it is estimated 3.4 million died of physical 
violence, yet mostly from disease, starvation, and mass displacement; the resulting humanitarian 
crisis has persisted along with silence from the international community. As a region where 
various non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have been known to routinely attack civilians, a 
widespread atmosphere of insecurity has shaped a securitized approach toward stabilizing it: a 
dominant state-building paradigm has manifested in the deployment of a United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping operation that has bolstered Congolese armed force presence in the region and 




8 Vinck et al. (2019) 
 
as well as foreign personnel. In this way, the Ebola response, also known as the riposte9, led by 
the Congolese government and as well as the WHO, a UN-body, has reproduced a structure in 
which both national and international lenses are difficult to disentangle, hence the fusion of both 
entities in the title of this thesis10. In the Eastern Congo, the existence of these forces, along with 
a small handful of independent humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the 
eastern region, symptomatic of chronic detachment of the national government, and world, to 
reality in the region, have normalized a state of emergency for civilians, generating a landscape 
of fear and distrust surfaced by Ebola.          
Main Argument 
 
The main argument is that the tenth Ebola outbreak in the DRC and the ensuing 
(inter)national response have witnessed a convergence of two conceptions of emergency: one 
created from a discursive tool that reflects Western notions of bio(in)security, and the other lived 
as experiences of chronic crisis and its concomitant physical and economic insecurities. The 
imposition of this temporary response and its treatment of Ebola as a disease posing “substantial 
public health consequences”, requiring “substantial” international action, and eventually, as an 
“exceptional event” worthy of “international concern” implies in the eyes of those populations 
most affected the insubstantial, and non-exceptional nature of other disease threats and sources 
of insecurity that have killed far greater numbers of people than Ebola11. This message 
transmitted to locals, without engagement of their perspectives from the start of the outbreak, has 
 
9 This word, originating in French, translates to “counter-attack”, which as will be demonstrated has framed a 
response that in many ways has taken a militaristic approach. 
10 (Inter)National 
11 Endemic malaria, diarrheal diseases, lower respiratory infections, and neonatal disorders are all among the top ten 
causes of death in the DRC as of 2018, a list on which Ebola does not figure. 
 
entrenched a disconnect between them and the response and considerably eroded distrust, a 
significant factor that has hampered anti-Ebola efforts, and led to considerable and at times 
deadly consequences for civilians and response workers. 
Objective 
While this thesis makes reference to other disease outbreaks, it seeks to work against 
what Crystal Biruk (2014) describes as a reification of a global health that looks quite different in 
separate locales, a common pitfall of reading across places. As many have noted, several 
characteristics of the tenth Ebola outbreak compared with that of West Africa pose puzzling 
questions: how can one make sense of the fact that the DRC outbreak, evolving in a much 
smaller, isolated region of one country rather than the three MRU countries in West Africa, has 
proven so intractable? Why, armed with a long list of lessons learned from the West Africa 
outbreak concerning community engagement and other areas of health emergency response, a 
more robust and updated scientific knowledge base on Ebola, and a demonstrably efficacious 
vaccine, has the riposte seen such high levels of local “resistance”, lasted 18 months, and 
sustained a CFR 1.7 times higher than that seen in West Africa? While pondering these questions 
may be useful in some respects, they also imply a commensurability between the conditions and 
realities in both outbreak locations12. While some lessons learned in West Africa have been 
neglected, others have been applied with varying levels of success: why? What are the precise 
 
12 Who is to say, for example, that certain types of strategies that worked in Sierra Leone, such as that of enlisting 
customary authorities as local intermediaries, would necessarily work in the Congolese provinces impacted by 
Ebola? As Joe Trapido (2019) has noted, in the DRC entrenched social hierarchies within communities have eroded 
trust of locals in their local leaders, and socioeconomic conditions have encouraged many local elites to profit from 
the outbreak through deliberately spreading misinformation. 
 
conditions and histories in the Eastern DRC that have complicated the application of these 
lessons?13  
While not taking an anthropological approach to examining the tenth Ebola outbreak, this 
thesis seeks to embody a spirit outlined by Biruk (2014) who calls for a more “particular” 
anthropology of global health, one attuned to Ebola in a particular time and place. By focusing 
predominantly on the case of the Congo, its history and its contemporary socio political realities, 
this project will devote itself to better understanding the specificity of the locale where the 
DRC’s tenth EVD outbreak has unraveled, and seek to illuminate with the resources available 
the voices of ordinary people, civilians, not holding positions of power, who are oftentimes the 
most marginalized and underrepresented14. How does the relationship between this particular 
citizenry and their particular government impact a global health emergency? 
 
13 This thesis also seeks to work against analyses of the intractability of the Ebola outbreak that emphasize the role 
of armed group violence which tends to obscure the complex sociopolitical realities facing civilians in the region 
affected. Articles published such as that of Laurie Garrett which link the spread of Ebola in the eastern DRC to a 
fight over “conflict minerals” (https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/17/your-cell-phone-is-spreading-ebola/) 
perpetuates long-disproven tropes that link minerals and cell phones with ongoing violence in the Congo (Vogel et 
al. 2019). The outbreak’s development in what many term an active conflict zone has made many scratch heads as to 
why disease containment in this particular locale has proven so challenging when in previous civil war contexts, 
such as the Biafran Civil War in Nigeria, and the Sri Lankan civil war, the delivery of medical supplies to those in 
need of it was largely successful. The discrepancy between the eastern DRC and these historical cases suggests the 
incommensurability between these locales, and the need to engage with the complexities of local power structures 
and distrust. 
14 By centering many parts of this thesis on populations most affected by this Ebola outbreak, many of whom are 
impoverished and historically marginalized, the author is conscious of how his analysis may identify with what 
Biruk (2014) terms the “global health slot”. Derived from Trouillot’s notion of the “savage-slot”, this concept 
conveys a trend in the social sciences, and particularly anthropology, which when approaching global health topics 
tends to focus on the subject living in pain, poverty, or other oppressive conditions. While the author has attempted 
to work against this type of pathologizing scholarly approach through illuminating acts of African resistance 
throughout colonial and postcolonial rule and the voices of the people in the affected provinces, he recognizes how 
he inevitably does reinforce a kind of medicalized savage slot; the subjects and their testimonies that appear in this 
work, “are always already illuminated against the objects they move through, negotiate, come up against, and are 
narrated by (here, global health and its anthropologists)” (Biruk 2014). The author has thus sought to remain aware 
of his positionality in researching and writing about this topic, and hopes to, despite his complicity in this reality, 
highlight the injustices this emergency response has obscured and contribute constructive analyses and 
recommendations to improve responses for populations most affected by this outbreak. 
 
The Chapters 
 The thesis will rely on various primary and secondary sources. Interviews were 
conducted with practitioners in the global health delivery and humanitarian sectors who were 
either on-the-ground in the DRC or who had previous field experience, and also with scholars in 
the fields of political science, Africana studies, and anthropology. In addition to interviewees, 
Social Science in Humanitarian Action Platform (SSHAP) reports, comprehensive compilations 
of surveys conducted by NGOs throughout the outbreak of community perceptions of the 
response, have provided the most raw data accessible to examine alternative explanations. 
Secondary sources have been pulled from the fields of history, global health, anthropology, 
Africana studies, political science, and humanitarianism and have provided contextual 
background and theoretical insights. 
 The first chapter is a context chapter that seeks to chart the history and more 
contemporary approaches to global health grounded in security. It seeks to help readers grasp the 
optics of global health security and its impact on approaches to health in Africa, which reflect 
colonial legacies and have led to cycles of panic and neglect in the continent that have hindered 
WHO’s commitment to health equity in developing countries in Africa and elsewhere. 
 The second chapter is an historical context chapter on the Congo, aiming to provide a 
glimpse through an alternate lens, that of the Congolese, through tracing Congolese responses to 
Belgian colonial medicine as well as examining the history of violence and emergency in the 
eastern region of the country. The epidemic of trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), will be the 
main focus of the historical analysis of Belgian colonial medicine and convey the ambivalence 
that defines African engagement with colonial medicine, which would have legacies in Ebola 
responses after the DRC’s independence. In this way the significance of African “resistance” 
 
throughout imperial and colonial rule in the Congo will be highlighted and nuanced, which 
combined with an overview of the history leading to chronic, silenced crisis in the Eastern DRC 
will provide an important backdrop to the “resistance” seen in the Ebola riposte. 
 The third chapter seeks to unpack this “resistance” observed amongst communities 
affected by Ebola in the Eastern provinces of North and South Kivu and Ituri and convey how 
they reflect frictions between the optics studied in the first two chapters: a Western, biosecurity 
one and lived experiences of chronic insecurity. To examine “resistance”, the stigmatizing 
connotations and inadequacies of the term will first be discussed while offering alternatives. 
Individuals’ various responses to the presence of Ebola and the riposte will be examined 
according to the recurrent narratives that likely underpin them, thus illuminating socio-political 
realities in the affected provinces and communities. 
 The final chapter will reflect on the lessons that have been learned from the consequences 
of this convergence of different conceptions of crisis in the Eastern DRC upon the arrival of 
Ebola and its ensuing response; in particular, efforts will be made to tease out sentiments of fear 
and blame which health crises produce, and which are often expressed in ways that reflect and 
reinforce the power structures and inequalities that epidemics and international responses 
surface. This chapter will furthermore discuss how a politicized, securitized response to Ebola in 
the DRC has brought to the fore inconsistent definitions of peace and state authority between the 
Congolese state and independent humanitarian NGOs, and the implications of these tensions 
between Médecin Sans Frontières (MSF’s) commitment to neutrality and emergency-based aid 
and the state’s desires to affirm statehood and strengthen national health policy. The 
humanization of the Ebola response will be discussed through highlighting the innovations 
 
developed by the Alliance for International Medical Action (ALIMA), while recommendations 

































Chapter 1: Disease and (In)Security: Examining the securitization of global health and Ebola in 
African ‘spaces of exception’  
Securitization and Aid in a Time of Crisis 
 One could argue that in various ways, the Western imagination has evolved today to 
become hyper-aware of the precariousness of the world, prone to dangerous, isolated, and 
unpredictable situations of ‘exception’. Caduff (2015) encapsulates this constant state of fragility 
he sees pervading contemporary discourse and conversations and governing our interactions and 
decisions in what he terms a “culture of danger”, which has effectively supplanted more positive 
affirmations and predictions of the world’s safety and stability. As human beings, our 
frameworks for interpreting the world are shaped by those memories that retain shock-inducing 
images and connotations often defying our imaginations: the September 11 suicide terrorist 
attacks and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami in South and Southeast Asia, to name a couple. 
Consequently, in a world where no one is immune from the threat of terrorism, environmental 
catastrophe, nuclear Armageddon, as well as crippling economic collapse, individuals, many in 
the Western world, bear a perceptual set that primes them to look for, anticipate, and respond to 
emergencies on various scales. This generalized anxiety could reflect in the increased 
militarization of national and international politics, as well as in what Duffield (2013) and other 
scholars view as the securitization of the international development and humanitarian fields.   
This heightened securitization in the West is underpinned by implicit logics that see 
many of the world’s dangers (“emergencies”) emanating from non-Western, mostly developing 
countries, a phenomenon revealed through the design and disbursal of international aid. The 
triumph of liberalism and market economies over communism at the end of the Cold War 
ushered in a new era in which international aid, primarily from developed to developing nations, 
 
became instrumentalized to spread Western ideals of peace and democracy, and serve as an 
antidote to the dangerous instability associated with the Third World (Nascimento 2015). This 
formal end to communism also reinvigorated the West with a sense of control in a new unipolar 
world, in which the “Third World” became seen as a threat, and thus an entity to dominate 
through the avenue, or guise, of development and humanitarian aid. Consequently, the notions of 
“crisis” and “emergency”, often invoked in reference to wars, natural disasters, and other 
extreme circumstances disproportionately enveloping the developing world, have prompted 
action on the part of the international community to allay the suffering produced, while also 
westernizing the places of intervention (economically, socially, etc.).  
This seemingly humanitarian impulse seems difficult to detach from the “dangers of 
underdevelopment” intimated through a more politicized Western aid discourse (Enria 2017). 
Coinciding with the fall of communism in 1989 was a general shift observed from a 
humanitarian model predicated on impartiality and neutrality to one rooted in an ethos of liberal 
development, market economy, and participatory democracy (Nascimento 2015). In a time of 
great American and Western hubris, the Global South bears connotations as a source of 
volatility, a breeding ground for conflict, unrest, and danger that must be fixed through liberal 
interventionism by the West, thus collapsing aid and security. And the potential for the dangers 
of the developing world to affect the West was further entrenched in national policy following 
9/11, when the notion of the “failed state”, (in that case, Afghanistan), became a fundamental 
threat to Western security; the 2002 national security strategy states that “America is now 
threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones”, thus synonymous with the 
unstable “Third World” countries (Bush 2002). 
 
The Securitization of Global Health 
Global health provides a useful example to study how the “Global South”, or the 
developing world, remains discursively and imaginatively constructed as an emerging threat to 
the well-being of the Western-dominated world order. When examining global health as a 
discipline and field today, to note is the concept’s evolution from that of “international health” 
which characterized health interventions throughout the late 19th and most of the 20th centuries. 
This linguistic shift generally signifies a larger philosophical one, from health work abroad 
focused on developing countries and predominantly concerned with addressing infectious and 
tropical diseases, water and sanitation, and maternal and child health, to a partnership between 
developed and developing countries collaborating to address health issues that are transnational 
in nature (Koplan et al. 2009). Theoretically, a more charity-based, biomedicine model that 
locates and contains health issues in the developing world has given way to an inherently 
multidisciplinary approach to achieving health equity in all nations for all people.  
Yet despite this renewed identity of global health as an apolitical quest to achieve good 
health and health equity for all, some interventions in the field of global health today seem to 
preserve rather than dismantle the negative connotations of the developing world with disease-
related dangers. The evolution and fortification of a more politicized humanitarian and 
development paradigm retains parallels with the field of global health, whose highly politicized 
nature seems continually reproduced through the securitization of the global health agenda. The 
connection between global health and security seems to have been forged beginning in the 
1990s, when the WHO embraced “global health” in the political climate of newly victorious 
capitalism and liberal democracy and a Western need to protect this political and cultural 
hegemony. As the WHO came to strengthen its financial position through appealing to external 
 
donors and forming global partnerships, so too did it come to bend its position to assume the role 
of protector of the West from certain diseases that were becoming increasingly threatening to the 
Occident; Ebola, West Nile Virus, and TB were all on the list of those diseases representing 
“palpable disease threats” associated with the ‘Third World’ (Brown et al. 2009).  
And in the past two decades, this link between global health and security has been 
significantly shaped by the ongoing War on Terror. This U.S.-declared military and ideological 
war in reaction to 9/11 implicated disease in a new, complex terrorist threat, a response to the 
release of anthrax spores soon after the terrorist attacks. The emergence of this relatively 
unprecedented idea that diseases can become weaponized led biological terrorism to become a 
security issue managed by the Department of Homeland Security, who classified diseases into 
three degrees of danger posed by “potential bio warfare agents”; category A, in which Ebola and 
anthrax have been placed, represents the highest risk category for diseases that requires special 
action for health preparedness. This recognition at the policy level of the mass harm and havoc 
that could be wreaked with the appropriate knowledge, skills and resources has precipitated and 
preserved a robust biodefense protocol in the U.S., where substantial government funds are 
continually allocated to the construction and maintenance of biosafety laboratories, and research 
on vaccines and therapies to neutralize bioterrorist agents (Hewlett and Hewlett, 159)15. 
The connection between global health and security has been reified by the fear of 
possible pandemics of lesser known diseases, prompting security concerns at political and 
individual levels. A relatively recent development in the history of global health is the revision of 
the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005, and formally adopted in 2007 by 196 
 
15 To note here as well is the role that pharmaceutical developments at the time played in the mounting bioterrorism 
threat, as research such as that of Finkel et al. (2001) demonstrated how knowledge used to develop these drugs and 
vaccines can be used to develop biological weapons (Frischknecht 2003). 
 
countries, including all 194 Member States of the WHO, who agreed to work together for global 
health security. These current regulations have evolved to encompass not only known but also 
unknown diseases and thus all potential threats to international health (Hanrieder and Kreuder-
Sonnen 2014). These revisions, which require all Member States to report disease outbreaks and 
other health events to the WHO, have also been seen as marking a shift of public health authority 
to the supranational level.  
This new authority governing the regulation of unknown or lesser known diseases can be 
seen in what Wenham (2019) explains as the framing of health threats as security threats, which 
can be seen in the WHO’s naming of “Disease X” as a priority research need, due to its potential 
to be caused by a pathogen that could lead to a serious, international pandemic. Ebola, for 
example, was a known but minimally researched disease with no vaccines or therapies at the 
time of the West Africa outbreak that became the largest outbreak of the disease on record and 
that reached African countries outside West Africa, France, and the U.S.; consequently, the virus 
was declared by the UN Security Council in 2014 a “threat to peace and security”, typifying the 
link between health and security (of the West) (Enria 2017). This declaration, indicative of the 
ways in which health crises can be viewed through security optics, is to be distinguished from 
the public health concerns driving the WHO’s declaration of a PHEIC during the outbreak, a 
decision that, as will be discussed, is not uninfluenced by Western security concerns.  
Global Health and the Pathologization of Africa 
 
Western conceptions of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (HIV/AIDS) in Africa serve as a point of entry into understanding the ways in which 
Africans have been associated with a disease-laden continent, evocative of colonial “civilizing” 
 
ventures in Africa. In George W. Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address, the then U.S. president 
announced his proposal of the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and his demanding 
of Congress to pledge $15 billion to this project, the highest amount of money ever committed 
by one nation to tackle a single disease. The president’s decision to create a governing apparatus 
for PEPFAR apart from United States Agency of International Development (USAID) and the 
Global Health Bureau, under the State Department, devoted exclusively to HIV/AIDS in Africa, 
constituted a response that seemingly placed Africa at the center of the security threat posed by 
HIV/AIDS at the time; in 2000, the UN Security Council passed an unprecedented resolution 
related to a health issue, Resolution 1308, which “declared HIV to be a threat to security and 
stability around the world” (Bradley and Taylor 2020). While the existence of an HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in Africa contributing to staggeringly high rates of the disease was undoubted—over 
50% of HIV/AIDS cases in the world at the time were in the continent—the urgency that 
President Bush conveyed to address what he saw as a “severe and urgent crisis abroad” 
reinforced connotations of the place as one of emergency and tragedy, home to a people in need 
of rescue. The moral and ideological underpinnings of PEPFAR evoked a discourse reminiscent 
of colonial “civilizing” ventures in the African continent that bolstered the superiority of the 
West and the primitiveness of the African. The president, himself an evangelical Christian, 
portrayed the new Emergency Plan as “a work of mercy beyond all current international efforts 
to help the people of Africa”, combining a sense of American exceptionalism with religious 
undertones that drove the project. 
In historicizing 19th-century Western medicine which has given way to the economic and 
moral hegemony of biomedicine in today’s world, Comaroff (1993) discusses the healing 
mission of the British evangelists in South Africa, whose rhetoric was to exploit the image of 
 
Africa as savage and suffering. These white missionaries’ depictions of the African led them to 
pose and ponder the deep moral ramifications of “[neglecting] to heal her wounds” and 
“[refusing] to disperse her darkness’’ which “[justified] ‘humane imperialism’, making it a 
heroic response rather than one of economic or political self-interest” (Comaroff 313). One could 
ask how legacies of this racist, self-aggrandizing rhetoric, rooted in healing metaphors which laid 
the groundwork for a colonial public health serving to discipline black populations, are visible in 
Bush’s very own rhetoric surrounding American actions to address HIV/AIDS in Africa. His 
determination to “provide humane care for millions of people suffering from AIDS and for 
children orphaned by AIDS”, invoked next to his affirmations that allaying this suffering 
“aligned with American [imperial] values”, served to bolster the heroic narrative of the U.S. 
PEPFAR provides a contemporary example of the continuity of colonial ideology’s 
embeddedness in representations of disease in Africa, which rely upon conscious and 
unconscious constructions of the Africans’ primitiveness16.  
 While sowing a more pronounced sense of panic amongst American and Western 
populations than did HIV/AIDS, Ebola, notably because of its arrival in the West, elicited 
responses that reinforced an Otherization of Africans living in environments ‘prone to disease 
crises’. One comment made by an American parent in response to a school letter notifying 
parents and guardians about two students arriving from Rwanda provides a salient example of 
this Otherization process: his combative statement, that “anybody from that area should just stay 
 
16 Colonial images of the primitive African body persist and serve to normalize the concepts of disease and 
emergency in the continent, while also Othering it. Achille Mbembe (2001) contends: “speaking rationally about 
Africa is not something that has ever come naturally” (1); the continent is an entity with its “peculiar feature that of 
shared roots with absolute brutality, sexual licence, and death” (1-2). The image of irrationality projected onto the 
continent, which in turn defies order, logic, sense, and even humanity, has proven an enduring strategy of the West 
in constructing its own self-image and rationalizing its own dominance. External discourse on HIV/AIDS in sub 
Saharan Africa serves as one example of the ways in which African physical and cultural traits were used to uphold 
an othering process that has been perpetuated through external discourse produced in reference to other “African” 
diseases, such as Ebola.  
 
there until all this stuff is resolved. There’s nobody affected here; let’s just keep it that way,” 
creates an Us versus Them dichotomy (Monson 12). The parent’s use of the term “that area” 
plays into the Africa-as-a-country trope, and in doing so also suggests that over “there”, in 
Africa, is where deadly diseases naturally generate, and should remain (Monson 12); his request 
to maintain the status quo, of preserving disease, danger, and death far away from “here”, 
implies that such realities are to be kept out of the U.S. and the West, where they are not 
supposed to occur. This parent’s comment joins a large group of commentary from mainstream 
media, forums and fringe publications, and everyday communication in the U.S. and the West 
that, in response to the possibility for a dangerous and diseased reality associated with the 
Othered Africa arriving in their “territory”, fueled a panic that propagated during this outbreak.   
The shock elicited from the West at the presentation of Ebola cases in the U.S. helps us to 
better understand what Adia Benton (2014) terms a “racial immuno-logic” that emerged from the 
West Africa outbreak, a term that helps one better understand the urgency the outbreak 
developed upon the arrival of cases in the West. A brief examination of the stories of three 
professionals comprising the Ebola response proves telling; one of these doctors was a Sierra 
Leonean national who contracted Ebola, prompting Sierra Leone’s government to organize a 
medical evacuation plan for the doctor to Germany later denied by the WHO; around the same 
time, two Dutch nationals, suspected of having been exposed to Ebola-infected individuals, were 
able to flee to the Dutch embassy in Ghana, and then sought immediate evacuation to the 
Netherlands. These two stories read together illustrate Benton’s concept of ‘racial immuno-logic’ 
at play during the outbreak, signifying that “wealthy whites are not supposed to die or fall ill 
when they are helping ‘others’; they are believed to be immune to the tragedies that befall black 
Africans.” Benton’s subsequent analysis of a tweet in which a senior fellow in global health at 
 
the Council on Foreign Relations denounced the infection control situation in ETCs after three 
American missionary workers contracted Ebola reveals its implications: the infection of white 
Americans, rather than the infection and death of thousands of black Africans preceding them, 
are what matter. And while the senior fellow dismisses the significance of black African deaths 
in her critique of infection prevention, she also fails to implicate the larger structural issues at 
play in the epidemic: the lack of preparedness of the three countries’ healthcare systems which 
reflect legacies of colonialism, structural adjustment programs of the West, and donor biases in 
Western countries. 
The WHO and Reinforced Cycles of Panic and Neglect Following Ebola in West Africa 
 
The WHO has consistently been guided by its overarching objective: “the attainment by 
all peoples of the highest possible level of health”, one it seeks to achieve through a broad 
approach to health promotion, which includes projects in the following areas: environmental 
hygiene, strengthening of health and epidemiological services, and advance work on eradicating 
epidemic, endemic, and other diseases (WHO Const. Art. 1). Yet since its beginning, the 
organization has faced considerable financial obstacles in working towards these more systemic 
goals. In the mid-to-late 1980s, a shift occurred from WHO’s reliance on its “regular budget” 
(collected from Member States’ contributions based on their population sizes and gross national 
products) to “extra budgetary funding” from multilateral agencies and rich, donor nations. 
Consequently, the WHO found itself at the mercy of the donors keeping its operations afloat, 
having to appeal to their demands and thus erect “vertical” health programmes completely 
independent of its other, neglected programs focused on building healthcare infrastructures 
(Brown et al. 2006). This period saw the ascendancy of the World Bank into the field of global 
health (which was then in common parlance referred to as “international health”), whose budget 
 
exceeded that of the WHO. Yet despite its economic prowess, the World Bank pragmatically saw 
the WHO as the best-poised technically to have the reins in matters of health and medicine. 
Subsequently, the 1990s saw the WHO assume the task of proving itself as a leader in the 
new “global health” field, which necessitated a financial repositioning of the organization, and   
an evolution in its particular role that consisted of tackling specific diseases at the expense of 
promoting longer-term health needs in developing countries. To obtain such a recognition at a 
global scale, the WHO in ways was forced to sacrifice its global, regional and country programs 
and supplant them with more focused global health initiatives that helped facilitate the 
construction of new global partnerships; the newly-elected Director-General of WHO Gro 
Harlem Brundtland's efforts were in many cases successful in creating long-lasting projects that 
would have considerable, long-term impacts on health in developing countries (Brown et al. 
2006). Yet it is important to consider how the WHO’s heightening acclaim at the international 
stage was also set against the backdrop of the panic-inducing HIV/AIDS pandemic. This new 
decade ushered in new anxieties about ‘emerging’ and ‘re-emerging’ infectious diseases, and 
their potential to cause pandemics. Regardless of its commitment to effect longer-term health 
improvements in poorer countries, the WHO increasingly assumed the role of emergency 
responder by drawing on outbreak reports, and developing proposals for the extension of the IHR 
to cover all potential future ‘public health emergencies of international concern’, the first time 
this notion was invoked (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014). Thus despite this decade that 
earned the WHO more legitimacy in the new field of global health, the pressure placed onto the 
organization in the face of increasing global disease threats contributed to an erosion of the 
WHO’s longer-term sustainable health development goals through the formation of financial 
partnerships that did not facilitate, as will be shown, its sustainable financial security. 
 
The WHO’s successful response to the SARS outbreak early in the new millennium 
would provide the impetus for the formal institutionalization of its emergency powers through 
the creation of the PHEIC, a process that would in ways exacerbate the budget restraints that 
have always limited the WHO’s capacities to fulfill its overarching objectives. Nowhere is the 
WHO designated as a primary responder in health emergencies; regarding health emergencies, 
the WHO’s enumerated functions clarify its role in emergency preparedness, collaboration and 
coordination in emergencies, and provision of assistance and necessary aid in health emergency 
situations upon request of governments (WHO Const. Ch. II, Art. 2); additionally, authority is 
conferred to the Executive Board “to take emergency measures within the functions and financial 
resources of the Organization” (WHO Const. Ch. VI, Art. 28, emphasis added). Yet the 
exceptional public health measures the WHO took during the 2003 outbreak, which included 
publicly shaming states for having not complied with certain regulations, and implementing 
travel warnings for the most affected countries, facilitated its effectiveness in containing a 
dangerous, unexpected disease outbreak, and led WHO’s Member-States to agree upon a 
codification of WHO’s emergency powers in the revised IHR in 2005 (Hanrieder and Kreuder-
Sonnen 2014). Under the revision, the UN-specialized WHO was endowed with the authority to 
declare a PHEIC. Up until Ebola emerged in West Africa, the WHO had used this capacity to 
declare two PHEICs: the 2009 H1N1 influenza epidemic, and global polio setbacks in 2014, to 
which it responded efficiently and further affirmed itself as a health emergency response leader. 
Yet with this increased discretion and recognition, WHO found itself overextended in its 
commitments, as well as financially restrained in an increasingly crowded global health arena, 
alongside public-private partnerships and non-state actors (Reddy et al. 2018).  
 
 And faced with the Ebola epidemic in West Africa beginning in 2014, the WHO would 
confront the consequences of its precarious financial status as well as its entrenchment as an 
emergency aid organization at the expense of its long-term, regional development goals. Lacking 
any medicines, vaccines or diagnostics with which to combat Ebola, the WHO, whose core 
budget depends on annual assessments of member states and donor-controlled trust funds for 
donor-selected conditions, was criticized by those who fund the organization and who ironically 
did not furnish it adequate funds to respond to the epidemic (Turshen and Gezmu 247). The 
WHO received paltry amounts of funding from the U.S. and other large donors for its Ebola 
response activities, after experiencing significant cuts to its budget in years preceding the 
outbreak17 (Turshen and Gezmu 2017). The Ebola outbreak, in which greater funding was 
allocated to private, voluntary partners rather than WHO provides one example of how the 
WHO’s more decentralized, regional approach to giving more autonomy to local governments to 
build robust, sustainable health systems continues to be marginalized. 
What has been prioritized is donor-driven aid via NGOs from some of the most 
financially powerful global health leaders, including the Gates Foundation, Global Fund for 
AIDS, TB, and Malaria, and UNAIDS; these and other members of the “H8” along with their 
narrowly-defined disease priorities in Africa have contributed to “stove-piped health sectors” ill-
equipped for responding to Ebola, as well as more generalized health issues in the affected 
countries (International Coordinating Group [ICG], 2015, in Turshen and Gezmu, 2017). 
Simultaneously, critical reports of WHO published by the ICG (2015) and Moon et al. (2015) in 
 
17 To better understand WHO’s acute financing challenges, it is helpful to put its budget into perspective: the 
WHO’s budget for the biennium 2018-19 was around $4.421 billion USD, while the annual healthcare and social 
services budget of Quebec, one province within Canada, is approximately $33 billion USD (Reddy et al. 2018). 
Scholars point out the irony in the fact that the WHO, charged with helping facilitate the “attainment by all peoples 
of the highest possible level of health”, is obligated to function on a budget equal in value to that of the University 
hospital in Geneva, and less than that of many major hospitals in the U.S. (Kickbusch 2015; Gostin 2015). 
 
response to the WHO’s perceived shortcomings in responding to Ebola in West Africa have 
called for an expansion of the WHO’s technical guidance and rapid early response capacities, 
and shrinking of its wide-ranging health activities (Turshen and Gezmu, 2017). Further preserved 
as an emergency aid organization, the WHO has become subsumed in cycles of development aid 
and emergency-induced panic that are continually reproduced in the neoliberal structuring of the 
global health arena18.  
And this structuring has had deadly implications for much of the continent; governments 
and philanthropists’ financial power has come to dictate whose lives matter, and the health 
conditions they implicitly believe to constitute “emergencies”. Indeed, as Maxmen (2019) notes 
in her analysis of the current Ebola outbreak in the DRC, “donors must be convinced of the value 
of their investments”, which in the DRC has forced the WHO to leverage the PHEIC as a way to 
garner more financial support to respond to the outbreak. What Turshen and Gezmu (2017) see 
as “the international community’s neglect of Third World public health” has reinforced global 
health inequalities, and seems to reveal an amnesia reminiscent of that described by Nascimento 
(2015) in reference to the humanitarian paradigm of the neoliberal era: a system “that 
simultaneously denies its own role in sustaining or addressing complex emergencies”, a 
phenomenon which in global health has had significant ramifications for the rights and dignity of 
populations affected by epidemics (257). 
 
18 Lakoff (2016) conveys well how the entrenchment as an emergency aid organization has ultimately resulted in an 
erosion of WHO’s power; despite the WHO’s catapulting into the global health governance arena as a looked-to 
guardian of health since its formation, and now in the era of emergencies, its authority remains rather illusory; in 
speaking about the IHR which served to embolden WHO’s emergency guidelines and operations, Lakoff (2016) 
writes “although the regulations served as the ligature for the strategy WHO called ‘global public health security in 
the 21st century,’ their actual operation rested on a twentieth-century paradigm of international health in which 
nation-states remained the site of authority and responsibility while WHO played a role of administrative 
coordination and technical norm-making” (3). 
 
Securitization of Health in ‘States of Exception’—Ebola as a Case Study 
 The securitization of the international response to Ebola in West Africa presents an 
important case study of the dangerous implications for democracy of the increasingly reified link 
between health and security. Bolten and Goguen (2017) apply Agamben’s (2005) ‘state of 
exception’, a concept in which state-level strategies demonstrate the potential to transform 
democracies into totalitarian states, to understand realities faced by communities during the 
PHEIC response. There, a village chief in Sierra Leone instituted an ‘iustitium’, defined as “the 
suspension of law in response to a mortal threat to governance (such as invasion or civil war),” 
prompted by news of a nearby Ebola case. The authors contrast this chief’s rapid quarantining 
policy to comply with national and international Ebola containment measures, with that of a 
neighboring village, whose chief decided to shelter an Ebola-infected individual and conceal the 
case. This latter community leader acted on a fear that his reporting the case would lead to the 
government seizing control of his village through the National Ebola Response Centre, which 
represented a hybrid “medical/security apparatus” that would “[usurp] any control that the chief 
or residents had over their activities” (Bolten and Goguen 2017). This response of the village 
chief and of the villagers of Mabele, who “in a crisis turned inward in order to evade ‘capture,’ 
both physically and in terms of the balance of power, by outsiders” anecdotally illustrates the 
local levels of fear and “resistance” to a coercive Ebola response that threatened people’s 
individual and collective autonomies. The response’s unique constellation of WHO responders, 
humanitarian actors and foreign and state military personnel, adopting policies of containment, 
isolation, quarantine and overall force, constituted a highly securitized response that infringed 
upon the very securities of those whom the response was supposedly seeking to protect from the 
disease.  
 
Indeed, the national and international repression by military forces of these types of 
resistance in West Africa reveal the intimate relation between humanitarian and military 
intervention to safeguard public health. This outbreak saw an unprecedented convergence 
between peace-keeping style practices and health crisis response with the establishment of the 
United Nations Mission for Emergency Ebola Response, the first-ever UN emergency health 
mission, a product of decisions made by the UN Security Council. The wider application of 
security paradigms to managing public health crises led to a widespread militarization of 
outbreak containment in West Africa, visible in various elements of control: the establishment of 
military and police checkpoints throughout the three countries, enforced quarantines, and 
punitive measures for all those not adhering to control protocols. In these situations of high 
security, humanitarian and military actors are expected rather than unusual bedfellows: Fassin 
and Pandolfi (2010) discuss how “the two sides come together...in a reciprocal and asymmetrical 
dependency”, a rapprochement which facilitates acceptance of militaries allied with 
humanitarians, and the protection of humanitarians in dangerous contexts (Benton 35). The 
highly securitized response to Ebola seen in West Africa, in which domestic militaries largely 
assumed the disciplining role under the auspices of foreign militaries, seems to have been 
informed by many of the security concerns associated with certain diseases, including Ebola, and 
its ability to become weaponized; consequently, during the outbreak the militarized state of 
Sierra Leone led one journalist, Bankolay Turay, and others to compare the “‘invisible war’ 
waged against Ebola to the country’s civil war” (Benton 38). This civilian framing of Ebola as an 
“invisible enemy” helps one better comprehend the degree of extreme measures taken by 
domestic militaries to purportedly safeguard public health. As Benton (2017) explains, acts of 
violence and suppression occurred with some frequency among vulnerable and marginalized 
 
communities: one example is in the West Point area of Monrovia, Liberia, where police and 
military opened fire and used tear gas against area residents who had become irate over an 
enforced quarantine and other measures taken without their consent (40).      
Despite the positive impact domestic military forces can have in a response, the West 
Africa outbreak showcases how viewing Ebola through an emergency lens can lead to the 
transgression of ethical laws and principles for the safeguarding of “public health”. Under 
International Human Rights Law, the Siracusa Principles state that “public health may be 
invoked as a ground for limiting certain rights in order to allow a state to take measures dealing 
with a serious threat to the health of the population or individual members of the population” 
(UN, 1985, cited in Cailin and Poncin 2015). Public health ethics also outline how collective 
actions such as quarantine, isolation and other public health measures can outweigh individual 
autonomy in public health emergencies, so long as such actions are grounded in public necessity, 
non-discrimination, scientific rationale, demonstrated effectiveness, reciprocity, justice and 
fairness (Cailin and Poncin 2015). Yet in West Africa, the quarantining techniques violated 
principles of non-discrimination, in that they sought to control the movement of those suspected 
of concealing their symptoms. Additionally, forcible quarantines in West Africa, lacking 
scientific evidence, led to severe stigma as well as temporary losses of livelihoods and personal 
possessions that only exacerbated poor families’ and individuals’ socioeconomic and health 
statuses (Cailin and Poncin 2015). And “resistance” to such coercive quarantines by vulnerable, 
marginalized communities in West Point, Liberia and Womey, Guinea, among other places, 
elicited repressive and violent retaliation from military and police personnel. One could argue 
that this marginalization and disproportionate disciplining of certain communities placed them 
into the latter category of Enria’s dichotomy of “Ebola heroes and dangerous bodies”: in contrast 
 
to the “active citizens that accepted biomedical expertise and took charge of sensitization 
drives”, those resisting were viewed as “holding up progress...putting their society at risk’’ 
(1614). This simultaneous elevation of those complying with the response and problematization 
of those deemed recalcitrant was concomitant with a stigmatization and rejection of traditional 
medicine and cultural practices, such as burial rites; consequently, existing social tensions and 
inequalities in communities were exacerbated.  
Importantly, these overt acts of “resistance” were removed from their specific historical 
and socio-political contexts rather than signaling the need to critically engage with local people’s 
perspectives; this reality demonstrates how events framed as emergencies tend to necessitate 
rapid responses that privilege certain “expert” voices, such as epidemiological ones in public 
health crises, over others, thus eclipsing local voices. As Benton (2017) writes, “an effort to 
demilitarize and downplay the coercive effects of public health requires dialogue and deep 
understanding of local political and social conflicts” (41). If anything has been learned from 
West Africa, it is that of the importance of seeking to understand the complexity of lived 
experience on-the-ground in outbreak environments, so as to avoid sacrificing the knowledge 
integral to achieving trust and responding to any disease outbreak. This thesis seeks to examine 
the extent to which these lessons have been learnt and applied in the current Ebola outbreak in 
the DRC, an analysis that subsequently requires an overview of the complex historical and socio-





Chapter 2: The View from the “Other”: Tracing the History of Responses to Medical 
Intervention in the Congo and Chronic Emergency in the Eastern Provinces 
Understanding Resistance to Address Silences in the Congo 
Any attempt to examine and understand local perceptions of the national and 
international response to Ebola in the eastern DRC should begin with efforts to grasp the 
complex historical context of the country from its imperial inception, and the precise socio-
political responses its Western-ruled origins engendered. Of particular interest in this thesis are 
the ways in which the introduction and oftentimes imposition of European medical models were 
interwoven with colonial conquest, eliciting simultaneous forms of “resistance” and engagement 
with Western medicine. The Congo provides a unique case to study these linkages between 
medicine and colonialism, which would characterize other colonized countries in Africa and 
elsewhere and have complex legacies on local reactions to international health responses.  
The complexities of this medical history should be placed against the backdrop of two 
major realities that characterized the Congo under Belgian imperial and colonial rule: 1) 
continual exploitation, violence, and physical and cultural oppression of the Congolese at the 
hands of Belgian colonizers, and 2) the emergence of different forms of Congolese resistance to 
the conditions forced upon them. Shedding light on these two components of Congolese history 
that this thesis seeks to tell corresponds to the importance of working against the silencing 
mechanisms that international forces and representations have on the atrocities perpetrated by 
Belgium, and that have removed agency from colonized peoples. Attention toward this second 
component can also help avoid what Depelchin (2005) views as a disproportionate focus on 
“facts of resistance” rather than “how the resisters defined and understood in their flesh, so to 
speak, what they were resisting”, a trend in scholarly discourse which reflects legacies of 
 
profoundly unequal access to the power to tell stories between those from colonizing and 
colonized societies (5). 
Furthermore, in studying any sort of contact between peoples bearing different histories, 
origins, and experiences, attention must be given to culture, whose definition will be taken from 
that used by Hewlett and Hewlett (2008): “knowledge and behaviors transmitted and acquired 
through social learning” (14). Culture, as they explain, governs how humans think and feel, and 
in the case of medicine, critically informs their perceptions of the type of medical care they 
receive and feel is appropriate (Hewlett and Hewlett 15). And importantly, past events 
experienced individually and collectively, such as the terrors and upheavals of colonialism, can 
have profound effects on how societies view and interpret the actions of others, which can 
become embedded in culture and passed onto future generations. Hence the importance of an 
historical analysis of the events transpiring in the Congo under Belgian imperial and colonial 
rule, neocolonialism, and continual external aggression which will help one begin to grasp the 
histories that prompted a multiplicity of responses, some resistant, some more receptive, 
advancing colonial encounters as dynamic rather than static processes.  
Imperial Violence and Primary Resistance in the Congo Free State 
 
At the onset of Belgian imperial rule, over 250 ethnic groups inhabiting the region that is 
now the Congo would be brought together as an arbitrarily defined geographical entity, subjected 
to the strategic use of terror and violence by the imperialists. In King Leopold II’s Congo “Free” 
State, which in reality operated as a “private enterprise” sustained through the plunder of the 
Congo’s natural resources, notably rubber, a “draconian system of forced labor” was elaborated 
and implemented by colonial officers (Stearns 7). In what many term an unknown holocaust, the 
 
King defaulted to the systematic use of torture, murder and other inhumane methods to eliminate 
any and all resistance posed by the Congolese, fitting Depelchin’s (2000) definition of 
conquering: “silencing those who might resist and/or might speak credibly about being 
conquered” (210). And outside the Congo, silencing of the truth was pursued through a media 
campaign furthered by the King and his entourage that gave the Belgian presence in the Congo a 
strong, humanitarian veneer, “disguising…[it] as a humanitarian venture for scientific research 
and economic development in Central Africa” (Stearns 7).  
The extreme brutality of the Congo Free State (CFS) would lead to different forms of 
resistance, to be distinguished by their ideological stances on colonial domination. One group of 
Europeans and Africans, and African Americans attempted to lift the systemic silencing of the 
CFS terror through organizing the first-ever transatlantic human rights campaign, the Congo 
Reform Association (CRA)19. Yet Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002), while appreciative of several 
European and African men’s successful efforts to end the brutality of the Leopoldian Congo, 
clarifies how they “did not represent a radical departure from humanitarianism as a social 
practice,” targeting the “symptoms” of the Congo problem rather than the “root causes”: the 
ideology of imperial domination20 (26). Their “heroism” as Hochschild (1998) describes it, is to 
be contrasted with primary modes of resistance as Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) describes: “armed 
struggle waged by an African people or state against the imposition of colonial rule” (42). This 
struggle would be taken on by Congolese professional warriors defending their territorial and 
 
19 These men, who combined their skills in photography and journalism into a political movement would document 
the abuses of the CFS, and would also have a legacy on humanitarianism visible in the presence of NGOs around the 
world that preserve a concern for human rights abuses globally. 
20 Indeed despite their important work in generating an adequate, global outcry to end the brutality of methods used 
by the Belgian imperialists, images produced by the movement in ways also objectified the Congolese and violated 
their agency. As Hunt (2016) writes, “The Congo atrocity photographs...reify maimed, black bodies, producing a 
traumatic form with an ‘insistent grammar of sight’”, thus reducing the Congolese to the level of victims, and like 
the imperial and soon-to-arrive colonial system, effacing their humanity, a mechanism of objectification that would 
resurface in future, internationalized Ebola outbreaks (28). 
 
trading rights in the Congo and defectors from the colonial army (42). Within the Force 
Publique, a maintained hierarchy of Africans with Whites at the top, regular abuse of African 
subordinates, and inadequate pay and food engendered contempt that sparked multi-ethnic 
revolts which in turn reified a sense of Congolese solidarity against the racist system (45). 
The Ambivalence of African Responses to Belgian Colonial Medicine: Sleeping Sickness as 
a Case Study 
 
Unraveling around the same time as these active forms of defiance was a more 
ambivalent response from the Congolese to one important element having a complex yet 
nonetheless participatory role in colonial conquest: the Belgian medical service. Here, studying 
colonized people’s responses to medical interventions in cross-cultural contexts in the Belgian 
Congo presents ideal opportunities to interrogate the ways in which the Belgian colonial medical 
service elicited 1) “resistance” of the Congolese, which at times blurred the lines between 
Congolese healing responses and insurgencies, and 2) engagement of the Congolese with 
Western medicine. To parse out these responses, the author will rely heavily on the 
comprehensive history, complete with illuminating primary sources, of the Belgian sleeping 
sickness campaign provided by Lyons (1992), as well as her scholarly approach which 
emphasizes the importance of placing medicine within history to obtain a more nuanced and 
accurate understanding of the responses it prompted. By focusing on the Belgian medical 
response to the epidemic of trypanosomiasis (AKA sleeping sickness), this analysis will also 
follow Lyons’ (1992) assertion of the importance of analyzing both disease and medicine 
together, in order to grasp the ways in which this specific disease acquired particular meanings 
and responses to be distinguished from those of other diseases. This section will also make use of 
Hunt’s (2016) analysis of Congolese therapeutic responses to Belgian colonialism and disease 
 
campaigns as embodied by the subversive character of a woman healer, and the ensuing 
difficulties in disentangling Belgian medical and security concerns during the colonial era. 
The Congolese’ own perceptions of the impacts of Belgian colonial rule in some respects 
necessarily involved the European power’s role in wreaking more harm and havoc on Congolese 
lives through the propagation of sleeping sickness. The Belgian colonialists actually contributed 
to the spread of this disease through continually forcing Congolese to collect rubber from 
Landolphia vines, in areas infested with the primary vectors of the illness, tsetse flies (Headrick 
2014). This reality became especially prevalent during WWI, when a large increase in European 
demands for rubber led to increased pressures on territorial governments to increase rubber 
collection in their districts; in July of 1915, the vice governor of Province Orientale, Malfeyt, 
instructed all his administrators that “the moment is...favorable to bring back the natives to the 
rubber harvest”21 (Lyons 34). Consequently, these demands and the harsh punishments inflicted 
on the Congolese for not satisfying rubber quotas induced many Africans to flee across colonial 
frontiers, as well as travel long distances into areas where they would come into closer contact 
with tsetse flies. Commissioner of Uele district in April 1917 would assert that the collection of 
rubber had become likely the principal cause of the propagation of sleeping sickness; and a 
senior administrator with years of experience in the north would explain in reference to the 
“blacks in the centre of Africa” that “we did not even protect them from the scourges that we 
have propagated in the necessity of occupying the country” (Lyons 36). 
Faced with a colonial regime that was harmful and deadly due to oppressive conditions as 
well as disease, the people of the northern Congo would have trouble dissociating the prevalence 
of deadly sleeping sickness from the overall political and military conquest of their lives: 
 
21 “Le moment est...favorable pour ramener les indigènes à la récolte de la gomme” 
 
It is not surprising that by the early 20th century, many African peoples perceived 
the increased incidence of disease as a kind of biological warfare which was part 
of the overall upheaval and chaos brought about by European military conquest 
and the roughshod tactics which accompanied early implementation of colonial 
authority” (Lyons 3).  
 
One Congolese woman Maria N’koi, a famed healer, spoke out against the Europeans who 
caused and spread the sleeping sickness. Apparently overheard linking the risk of black 
extinction with the necessity to expel whites, she responded to colonial interrogators after her 
arrest, “why would I make war with the whites?” (Hunt 82). This linking of extermination, yet 
more largely intentional war and violence, with disease interestingly echoes anxieties of the West 
about bioterrorist threats posed by diseases endemic to colonized regions whose propagation was 
facilitated by colonizers themselves. Consequently, the Congolese’ perceptions of the intimate 
relation between colonial subjugation and disease would foreshadow local responses to disease 
epidemics and international responses later in the 20th century and into the 21st century in 
Central Africa.   
Research conducted by the Liverpool School would advance an inaccurate aetiology of 
sleeping sickness that would inform the stringent and in many ways dehumanizing containment 
measures of the Belgian colonial campaign against the disease. Invited by King Leopold II of 
Belgium, scientists from the Liverpool School in England studied sleeping sickness in the Congo 
beginning in 1903, performing physical examinations, autopsies, and other procedures involving 
African bodies, while completely neglecting the ecology of the disease. Their assumptions of 
sleeping sickness being a contagious and infectious illness led them to conclude that because 
“parasites were found sporadically in blood and spinal fluid...it was important to watch cases of 
trypanosomiasis very carefully in order to exclude secondary infections” (Lyons 92-3). Their 
additional finding that “there was a low percentage of T. gambiense infection among the natives 
 
of the lower Congo region” seemed to be explained by a Liverpool team member John Todd’s 
linking of the spread of sleeping sickness to the movement of Africans from west to east in the 
Congo territory22. Operating under the assumption of the superiority of the European medical 
ethos over African knowledge or capacities to combat the disease23, the Belgians would elaborate 
a strategy of isolation of infected individuals as well as suspected cases through the use of the 
cordon sanitaire. On 7 December 1905, the Liverpool researchers would issue their “First 
comprehensive Sleeping Sickness Instructions” systematizing the isolation strategy: infected 
individuals and also suspects had to be moved to lazarets, isolation centres; and if natives had to 
cross a river to get to the lazaret, “they were placed in movable cages surrounded on all sides by 
fine wire net” (Lyons 108). Conditions inside these isolation centres were generally deplorable, 
and frightening for internees: in June 1910, the lazaret director Dr. Bottalico shared that “We 
have had no meat or fish, as what should go to the patients has been taken for the labourers and 
soldiers...people who are here...often stay months and receive no salt or oil and are forced to 
roam about haggling” (Lyons 114). By 1910, the mortality rate at Ibembo lazaret had reached 
33%, and because of the associations made between the centers and death, as well as patients’ 
separation from their families, the lazarets became known as ‘death camps’24 (Lyons 120). 
Yet Africans did not unanimously accept these dehumanizing conditions, as well as the 
imposition of forced physical examinations and vaccines that conflicted with local disease 
aetiologies and medical paradigms; rather, for some who survived, their active observations led 
 
22 This geographical lens through which the researchers viewed the disease supported the Europeans’ perception of 
the disease as an “alien invader”, an “enemy” that had to be prevented from encroaching on uninfected regions; this 
analysis informed the intense campaign against the disease that was conceived of as a “lutte” or battle, a marrying of 
public health with security that would have apparent legacies in the Congo (Lyons 56). 
23 A medical administrator in 1943 asserted that “we know how primitive and futile was the knowledge of the 
natives in matters of hygiene” (Lyons 103). 
24 Despite the expressed opinions of some doctors at the time against the coercive isolation of infected or suspected 
Africans, as well as the forced administration of the atoxyl medication, which was shown to cause blindness in 
some, these protocols would dominate the Belgian medical approach. 
 
them to forge several forms of overt and passive resistance that were successful in triggering 
reforms in the Belgian colonial services in 1910. While in response to the horrid state of the 
lazarets, riots at Ibembo and elsewhere should also be read as a consequence of the incongruence 
between European and African conceptions of quarantine: while the African model followed the 
principle of removing an individual from harmful influences in their social sphere, the Belgian, 
and more largely, European model was based on protecting the group from the individual (Lyons 
190). In response to physical examinations, which for most Congolese represented a foreign and 
invasive procedure which they opposed for many years, individuals would hide from authorities, 
often with the help of their local chiefs. The needle, also an invasive technique, had horrific 
connotations for Africans that led them to flee from doctors, and that also inspired rumours that 
doctors were using needles to deliberately infect people and spread diseases (Lyons 189). These 
various forms of “resistance” engendered tangible reforms that in ways improved natives’ 
experiences with the Belgian medical system. In response to such pressures from Africans, the 
lazarets became more open, “village-lazerets”, to which only the patients in the most advanced 
stages of the disease would go. Less “prison-like”, these new centers could welcome patients’ 
immediate families, while patients with less advanced symptoms could be treated at injection 
clinics located closer to their homes (Lyons 126). 
However, these reforms would also coincide with the shift to a colonial-ruled Congo, a 
transition in which the new colonial administration would affirm its legitimacy and control of 
African peoples through methods in which medicine and security reinforced each other. Indeed, 
reforming the medical services seemed to provide a convenient way for the Belgian colonists to 
not only quell African insurrections, yet also separate itself from the unconscionable horrors of 
the CFS by appearing more “humane” as they continued conquering the native peoples. The 
 
imposition of medical passports as well as surveillance and screening stations for sleeping 
sickness became measures of control of the new colonial administration: on 30 April 1910, all 
Africans had to carry medical passports, while at the stations Africans were examined and also 
issued passports to further control movements. In addition, increasing surveys of sleeping 
sickness in the north were completed by European doctors, who, when accompanied by 
administrative representatives, led natives to equate the public health campaign to other facets of 
state control, such as taxing (Lyons 132). The natives’ conflation of medical and state hegemony 
brings back the enigmatic figure of the healer Maria N’koi, whose speaking out against sleeping 
sickness, and assertions that Belgium’s archenemies, a set of ancestral spirits, would “help her 
charms drive the Belgians out of their colony”, inspired a tax rebellion and armed insurrections; 
her consequent arrest and relegation by the Belgian colonial state, as Hunt (2016) argues, 
demonstrates her to have been emblematic of the ways in which “healing” from disease and 
insurgencies against elements of colonial rule became intertwined. While she herself represented 
a security threat, so too did many of the African natives whose supposed recalcitrance 
precipitated an increasingly highly securitized Belgian medical operation, in which doctors going 
into villages in the 1920s and 30s were accompanied by armed soldiers of the Force Publique.  
In this way, the more negative responses and forms of “resistance” to Belgian medical 
services must be contextualized within a system in which medicine and colonial power were 
intimately linked. As Lyons (1992) writes, “healing conferred authority, and medicine 
throughout history has been related to power”, a power that in colonial situations infringed upon 
fundamental notions of cultural, and consequently, national, autonomy of the colonized (197). 
Through an analysis of the reactions of Algerian colonized peoples to Western medicine 
introduced by the French colonizers, Fanon (1965) propounds that what he frequently observed 
 
as a rejection of Western medicine from the colonized constituted an effort on the part of this 
group to defend its individual and collective identities. In his view, the colonized individual 
views any form of acceptance of Western medicine as a validation of the “Western technique”, 
engendering a sense of alienation from their own culture, and thus from their own self (236). 
Medicine was one among many elements of colonial rule with which colonized peoples’ 
ambivalent engagements distanciated them from their own bodies, violating their agencies. In 
this way, their forms of “resistance” signify not necessarily an outright rejection of Western 
biomedicine, but rather their efforts to survive and preserve their basic human rights, asserting 
their agency, identity, and more fundamentally, their humanity. 
 Africans’ more positive responses to the Belgian medical services aimed at addressing 
sleeping sickness and other medical issues, reveal how the particularities of the sleeping sickness 
campaign produced considerable barriers to effective medical intervention. Evidence shows that 
receptivity of natives to the sleeping sickness campaign could be explained by the fact that they 
witnessed favourable results of treating a chief, whom they respected and trusted. Natives could 
have also sought out the lazarets for their family members when the latter were in advanced 
stages of the disease, viewing running away or abandonment of the victims as the only possible 
responses. Yet as a general trend, most Africans avoided the lazarets and the hospitals, while 
colonized subjects in the Congo were generally open to other forms of medical care, such as the 
removal of visible, painful hernias, and also later in the colonial era, injections for yaws, which 
led to its eradication. Indeed, some historians do argue that biomedicine and public health were 
important and positive legacies left in the wake of Belgian colonial rule, an opinion which 
deserves exploration. Despite the predominance of a vertical health approach as well as a 
medical campaign that in many ways buttressed state power and policed African bodies, Belgian 
 
colonialism would lead to the creation of rural primary health clinics and health services. These 
positive contributions of colonialism to medicine should not be discounted, as well as the 
positive ways that Africans themselves interpreted and engaged with some elements of these 
developments. The sleeping sickness campaign and its mostly negative features and responses 
illustrates the consequences of power and politics being inextricable from the declaration and 
response to epidemics, in contexts that reflect historically unequal relationships. 
Legacies of Colonial Medicine in Ebola Responses in the Congo  
While the Belgians argued that the success of their medical service was “best 
exemplified” by their capacities to contain sleeping sickness, it seems that improved overall 
health in the colonies beginning around 1930 could have and should have been attributed to the 
development of a more generalized, and cost-effective, health delivery model that Lyons (1992) 
refers to as ‘horizontal’; this approach was characterized by an increased prevalence of primary 
health clinics permitting treatment of a broader range of health issues including infant and child 
care, nutrition, public health and sanitation, endemic and epidemic diseases, and vaccination 
campaigns, such as for smallpox; ordinances such as those of 27 May and 10 June 1925 calling 
for African infirmiers and medical assistants and African auxiliaries in medical services, and 
those of 1930 recruiting Africans as sanitary guards to assist with hygiene measures in urban 
centers, seemed to lay the groundwork for a more robust medical service comprised of Africans 
(226); this equipping of Africans themselves with the skills to contribute to improvements in 
hygiene could be a factor in the improved overall health trends observed beginning in the 1930s, 
correlating with the decline of sleeping sickness.  
Points made in an address given in 1929 by Dr. A. Wauters, a member of the National 
Committee of Kivu and Secretary of the Colonial Commission of the Belgian Workers Party, 
 
also suggest that other related social factors could undergird such improvements; faced with the 
consistent reality of population decline in the Congo, Belgian social policies at the time called 
for not only the setting up of Health and Sanitary Commissions, but also improved nutrition and 
maternal and child health in wage labourers and women and children: “taking into consideration 
local difficulties in regard to supplies, [regulations for employers] lay down the quantity of fats, 
hydrates, carbon, etc., which rations must contain, and even mention the requisite number of 
calories,” while various Infant Welfare and Maternity Centres, and schools for native midwives 
were successfully organized (59). The partitioning of each of the four provinces into economic 
zones which granted the Congolese concessions for various undertakings, including agricultural 
ones that allowed natives to remain in their natural environments and pursue jobs with which 
they were accustomed, could also have facilitated more Congolese economic self-sufficiency, 
and a decline in the social and economic reshuffling that had defined Belgian colonial rule for so 
long and contributed to displacement and famine. “Spreading professional instruction as much as 
possible” was an additional cited priority of Wauters, who also lauded the education of over 1 
million students in schools throughout the Congo (59); hence, improved basic health services and 
social conditions in the Congo, rather than the narrow focus on single epidemic diseases such as 
sleeping sickness, seem more compelling factors in the decline of the disease and general, 
positive trends seen in health beginning in the 1930s.  
Yet as these underlying factors suggest, the variation in health status of natives became a 
mirror for that of social conditions in the Colony, which by 1960 had resulted in an uneven 
distribution of improved health, that was also exacerbated by the colonial power’s fixation on 
addressing several endemic and epidemic diseases. Notably, disparities manifested in health 
standards and living conditions between urban and rural areas of the Congo, with poorer natives 
 
in the rural regions lacking hygienic controls of food supplies and clean drinking water (U.S. 
Dept. of Health, Edu, and Welfare III). By 1960, health services, channeled through hospitals 
and dispensaries, and aimed at the main endemic diseases—malaria, sleeping sickness, leprosy, 
and tuberculosis—provided only one bed per every 16,000 inhabitants throughout the Congo. 
Simultaneously, by the time of 1960, no Africans had been officially trained as physicians, while 
the practicing European ones were stretched to meet the needs of a large population. Thus, these 
conditions characterizing the colonial epoch and bearing a legacy on the post-independence era 
set an important backdrop for the 1976 Ebola outbreak. With “health standards and living 
conditions [varying] markedly...among peoples in different stages of cultural progress” in the 
Congo, many in the rural provinces, areas with a dearth of “modern” medical services, would 
witness consecutive Ebola outbreaks; these epidemics would elicit local cultural responses that 
would in different ways conflict with international health responses reminiscent of colonial 
public health responses to epidemic diseases (U.S. Dept. of Health, Edu, and Welfare III). 
The Congolese response to contain the first Ebola outbreak in Yambuku, Zaire (now 
DRC) in 1976 provides a useful example of how the knowledge, skills and resilience to respond 
to disease outbreaks remained immanent within local cultures and belief systems. As Hewlett 
and Hewlett (2008) explain, the outbreak, which had an 88% CFR and saw 318 deaths, was 
relatively short-lived and contained by the local population before the arrival of international 
teams. Many inhabitants of Yambuku explained that the Ebola outbreak originated from 
ancestral spirits disgruntled over a “human transgression” which led them to send magical poison 
darts, ndoki, to cause illness; the invocation of this term, ndoki, which as analyzed by Likaka 
(2009) was historically assigned by many Congolese to a colonial station chief whom they saw 
as using harmful stereotypes that denied them justice during colonialism, could suggest a fear or 
 
mistrust of white foreigners in the “human transgression” referenced in the Ebola story (93). 
With no foreign presence in Yambuku during the outbreak, villagers turned to local strategies 
that helped halt the spread of the disease: following the orders of healers and chiefs, they erected 
bamboo poles with special, protective objects, while maintaining dutiful knowledge of who 
entered and exited their community (Hewlett and Hewlett 104). Yambuku residents also 
abstained from traditional burial practices that involved touching loved ones (105). After this 
outbreak, a subsequent one in Kikwit, DRC in 1995 would be shaped by a local response 
indicative of a more pronounced resurgence of colonial and postcolonial memories influenced by 
international presence.  
Indeed, the origin stories for and local reactions to this Ebola outbreak, bearing a similar 
death toll and CFR as the one in Yambuku, revealed and reinforced the accumulated beliefs and 
meanings surrounding foreign medical personnel held by recently colonized, African 
populations. While local perceptions and responses to the outbreak received scant media 
attention, several sources do discuss local explanations for the outbreak suggestive of the deep-
rooted mistrust of internationally-linked personnel25 (Hewlett and Hewlett 105). One origin story 
 
25 What did receive substantial Western media attention was the sensationalized suffering caused by Ebola, which 
transmitted inaccurate portrayals of the outbreak. Heymann et al. (1999) note how representatives of the news media 
arrived unannounced, breaching ethical standards such as patient consent to be filmed, and demonstrating gross 
cultural insensitivity by filming family members caring for the sick and burying the dead. The authors also note how 
this presence of Western media personnel greatly disrupted the work of response teams, rendering necessary 
resources such as response vehicles more scarce for response crew. 
    The sensational dimension to this media frenzy which certainly contributed to the fear-inducing, exotic 
connotations of Ebola seen in Western films and books emerging around the same time also, as Heymann et al. 
(1999) argue, played a critical role in facilitating a rapid, timely mobilization of national and international experts 
and resources to adequately contain the outbreak. This role of the media in eliciting international attention and 
concern seems to continue a trend begun in the Congo during the Free State years with the CRA; in Kikwit, as well 
as in imperial Congo, Congolese continue to be victimized, their suffering amplified for the gaze of the international 
community, and thus they remain to a certain extent objects for the West. This outbreak, which solidified an 
internationalization of Ebola, resurrects conversations about the ethics of the CRA, as both events importantly 
engendered concern from outsiders at the “suffering” of Congolese, while at the same time not advancing criticisms 
of larger systems (i e imperial/colonial ideology, and structural adjustment programs and neoliberal policies 
perpetuating the underdevelopment of the DRC’s healthcare resources). 
 
recounted that the Ebola outbreak was caused by the curse of Kungu Pemba, the chief of the 
village of Kipuka who was the first local leader in the region to resist the intrusion of the colonial 
state, and who punished foreigners and national elites when trespassing on his grave. A disease 
outbreak seemed to resurrect for villagers of Kikwit notions of resistance and the defense of local 
autonomy, identity, and independence, all of which Pemba embodied. Some villagers also 
believed that an American missionary working in a nearby hospital was at the origin of the Ebola 
transmission: vengeful following his capture by other missionaries for having transformed into a 
hippopotamus and terrorized locals, Dr. Fontaine then conspired with Mobutu, the country’s 
Western-backed dictator, to obtain the Ebola virus in a European lab and then deliberately infect 
villagers of Kikwit, a village Mobutu disliked (Hewlett and Hewlett 108). 
The responses elicited from local communities to Ebola outbreaks in the DRC seem to 
have given voice to these names, non-violent forms of expression and opposition to colonial rule 
that were passed down to generations, and embedded in colloquialisms and everyday 
conversations. Kungu Pemba’s name encapsulated what he symbolized for locals: kungu coming 
from ‘Kongo’, the name of the precolonial state, and pemba referring to whiteness, pembe, of 
ancestral spirits, ideas emblematic of his comforting, guiding nature untouched by colonialism 
and corruption. Contrastingly, Dr. Fontaine’s American, white, foreign identity led to depictions 
of him as a source of fear, violence, death, and evil, representing the antithesis of the ideals 
embodied by Kungu Pemba. Likaka (2009) analyzes the ways in which Congolese people’s 
naming of representatives of colonialism constituted less overt forms of resistance to colonial 
rule through cementing negative associations with such figures and inscribed into Congolese 
collective memory. This naming strategy also gave voice to a profound fear of the Belgian 
colonizer that villagers sought to propagate throughout their communities: names such as 
 
Chakundia, ‘he who can eat me’, and Koma-Koma, ‘he who can strangle me’, seem to bear a 
resemblance to the threatening images created of Dr. Fontaine26 (Likaka 96). The ways in which 
colonial and postcolonial figures feature in the narratives produced by local populations illustrate 
what Hewlett and Hewlett (2008) see as the “unmistakable links...between the missions, whites, 
biomedical healthcare, and the postcolonial state”, and the lack of sensitivity to such histories in 
international response teams (108). The consequent lack of trust in both international and 
state/national responders is not unique to the DRC; however, the eastern DRC’s added dimension 
of being an active conflict zone and a location of intersecting humanitarian crises complicates the 
analysis, necessitating an understanding of how this ongoing violence can be situated in the 
region’s complex socio-political history.  
(Inter)National Neglect and Ethnic Conflict Preceding Large-Scale Violence in the East: 
1965-96 
 
At the onset of independence, Western-backed dictator Joseph-Désiré Mobutu would 
exacerbate the ethnic tensions created under Belgian colonial rule in the eastern DRC and fuel 
ongoing violence. Starting in the 1930s, the Belgian colonial administration would disrupt social 
relations through implementation of a contentious immigration policy that welcomed tens of 
thousands of people from Rwanda to plantations of the Kivus and mines of Katanga, conferring 
these new arrivals with greater political and economic power than that of indigenous Congolese 
(Autesserre 2010: 133-34). Mobutu’s favoring of Banyarwanda (signifying those of Rwandan 
descent) and also Tutsi pastoralists who did not threaten his regime deepened political and social 
inequalities, as he gave more land to Banyarwanda and undermined indigenous Congolese 
 
26 One is also reminded of the reappearance of ndoki during the Yambuku outbreak, thus demonstrating the 
conservation of Congolese’ particularly negative perceptions of Westerners and what they represent. 
 
agricultural autonomy. Far from passive onlookers accepting these affronts to their land and 
political rights, indigenous citizens would form lobbies to curtail Banyarwanda power, and also 
contribute to ongoing, “low-level” violence in North Kivu between the two groups throughout 
the 1980s; simultaneously, similar tensions erupting into violence between indigenous groups 
and those of Rwandan descent occurred in South Kivu. This violence was sustained through 
ethnic conflict that was inextricably linked to conflict over land and political power.  
The Kivus would experience continual violence and increasing rates of corruption and 
exploitation into the 1990s under Mobutu’s policy of géopolitique, a strategy of maintaining 
control of the region that would quickly deteriorate, sowing a mistrust for a state difficult to 
disentangle from the West and neighboring countries. With the multiplicity of ethnic groups 
vying for political and economic power in the region, this strategy only heightened the 
competition for power, leading to the Masisi War in 1993 which in North Kivu led to 1,000 
deaths and the displacement of 130,000. At the same time, foreign states would continue to exert 
control over the eastern region through competition for much coveted conflict minerals. What 
one understands from this important backdrop of violence and tension in the eastern regions 
preceding these wars is a reality that would have a legacy far outlasting them: “Mobutu’s ruling 
strategies largely caused the disintegration of state authority in the eastern Congo and eroded 
existing forms of decentralized authority” (Autesserre 2010: 142). Any semblance of a 
democratic form of governance for the eastern DRC was supplanted by an institutionalized form 
of opportunistic pillage of the region’s resources, and its descent into disorder (Turner 120). 
The Congo Wars: The Myth of Liberation in the East and Congolese Resistance: 1996-2003 
Consequently, the toppling of Mobutu during the “First War” in the eastern DRC in 1996 
would symbolize an initially decisive victory for the Congolese yet would ultimately lead to a 
 
continuation of civilians’ social and economic plights and widespread human rights violations. In 
response to increased tensions and violence in the eastern regions due to the influx of Rwandan 
Hutu refugees which led to a proxy war for the Hutu/Tutsi conflict, Uganda and Rwanda invaded 
the Congo to depose the indifferent Mobutu, elevating the Congolese rebel Laurent Kabila, a 
way for their involvement in Congolese affairs to appear to have national ownership (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 225). Many Congolese embraced this war as one of “Liberation”, a culmination to their 
long struggle for true independence after the end of Belgian colonial rule27. Yet their celebration 
of a new leader who symbolized liberation at a seemingly new chapter in Congo’s, and the East’s 
history, quickly became disillusionment. Lacking any clear vision of what his political structure 
would resemble and how it would function, Kabila confirmed the negative views of other 
Congolese who struggled to overthrow Mobutu peacefully, as he replicated rather than 
eliminated many of Mobutu’s autocratic “leadership” activities, and contributed no marked 
improvements to civilians’ rights and qualities of life28 (Stearns 90). 
Subsequently, inhabitants of the eastern DRC would see their region become embroiled 
in a second war, whose roots, opportunistic, foreign pillage by foreign powers, would engender a 
humanitarian crisis met by silence and inaction of the international community. Deciding to 
capitalize on the vacuum of authority preserved by Kabila, Uganda and Rwanda, backed by the 
U.S., would create a façade of civil war to conduct an invasion in 1998 through the eastern DRC 
to secure its access to the region’s natural resources, which would disproportionately affect 
unarmed civilians: according to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), by 2000, 1,700,000 
 
27 By 1996, 31 years of Mobutu’s predatory state had led to undernourishment of 60% of Zaire/DRC’s population, 
and decimated infrastructure and industry (Stearns 95). 
28 In addition, neighboring countries’ military strategies during the rebellion to install Kabila led to alleged 
massacres of Hutu refugees in the eastern regions, believed to have constituted acts of genocide against the Hutus 
according to the UN that were never seriously examined (Turner 5). 
 
individuals died in the east due to the war, due to direct violence but mostly to hunger, 
malnutrition, the disintegration of healthcare, and internal displacement (Turner 3); the IRC 
further estimated at least 3.3 million Congolese died between August 1998 and November 
200229. The Kivus were also disproportionately impacted by massacres and acts of violence 
against innocent women, men, and children. The resounding silence of the international 
community to the ongoing bloodshed and humanitarian crisis30 must be situated within the 
reality of continual plunder of the Congo in the era of globalization: the movement of money and 
its investment in off-shore banks has created ripe opportunities for money launderers, arms 
merchants, warlords, and other opportunistic figures to pounce on the country’s and region’s 
resources, thus profiting from the almost anarchic conditions that prevail, and the perpetual crisis 
in which its people live.   
 Yet civilians in the eastern DRC would channel their resistance strategies to both external 
and internal aggressors which would have an enduring legacy on Congolese resilience and 
perceptions of authorities. Courageous members of civil society would transmit their messages 
through a nonviolent campaign despite being targeted through executions, disappearances, and 
other crimes. Added to this strategy would be the growth of civil society organizations as well as 
the formation of NSAGs as vectors of the fight for democracy, and more fundamentally, a basic 
improvement in the lives of Congolese people. In the east, people’s lived experiences and 
collective memories associated with their circumstances would see them negate the myths of 
civil war and develop a nuanced understanding of the obstacles to their vision of the country: 
 
29 These figures could be higher, and make the Congo Wars collectively the deadliest conflict since WWII. 
30 The UN Security Council took two years, until June 2000, before making a formal request to Uganda and Rwanda 
to withdraw troops from the DRC (Nzongola-Ntalaja 232). 
 
both foreign powers, and the Congolese state, cementing a distrust of the two that would 
continue and worsen in the decades following the official “end” of the war period. 
Keeping the Peace? Violence, the Failure to Protect, and Chronic “Emergency” in the 
Eastern DRC: 2003-Present 
 
 Three structural factors responsible for what some scholars call a “third war” in the 
Congo, and “everyday emergency” by NGOs such as MSF31, having direct implications for 
civilians’ lives and attitudes toward state and international actors, will be discussed: 1) violence 
perpetrated by the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and 
NSAGs, 2) the shortcomings of international peacekeeping, and 3) implications for humanitarian 
aid and healthcare provision in the eastern provinces. 
Unarmed civilians in the eastern DRC have continued experiencing severe human rights 
violations extending beyond the war period at the hands of various armed groups, abuses in 
which FARDC officers32 have often been complicit. While some NSAGs have helped civilians 
forge paths toward reclaiming rights, many do not operate within the interest of civilians’ well-
being, some controlling the wealth of the region’s natural resources, and others employing 
coercive means and violence against civilians33 to further their political and ideological agendas. 
Despite the victory in 2014 of the FARDC over M23, a rebel military group based in North Kivu 
notorious for summary executions and rape, various armed groups continue to occupy the eastern 
 
31 MSF has published numerous reports over the year detailing the silencing surrounding lived  
https://www.msf.org/everyday-emergency-silent-suffering-democratic-republic-congo  
32 Under the agreement of the Sun City Deal, signed in 2003 by Congolese armed groups, previous rebel groups 
from the war period were incorporated into the FARDC, whose purpose in the east was to co-opt armed rivals and 
maintain a cohesive military presence. Yet many of these national officers, coming from low socioeconomic 
backgrounds, would use their proximity to armed groups in the east to their advantage, defecting from their positions 
to these groups to negotiate better pay and positions, which oftentimes benefited local politicians (Stearns and Vogel 
2015).  
33 While elaborating on the countless acts of violence in the eastern DRC is outside the scope of this project, a 
discussion of some more recent ones can offer a glimpse into the realities faced by civilians. 
 
region and contribute to violence and mass displacement (Stearns and Vogel 2015). Between 
October 2014 and February 2016, the city of Beni in the northeast witnessed 500 civilian deaths, 
many from decapitation in front of loved ones, and the displacement of tens of thousands. While 
the UN Mission and the Congolese government locate the main responsibility for these criminal 
acts with the Allied Democratic Forces, research collected from local testimonies by the Congo 
Research Group (2016) demonstrates to the contrary the ways in which this explanation masks 
the complicity and even participation of the FARDC in the violence. Analyses also implicate 
MONUSCO in the attacks, who were reported to have prioritized supporting the authority of the 
state (the FARDC) over the protection of civilians, and produced a skewed narrative of the 
killings.  
MONUC/MONUSCO’s top-down, ideological approach and its intimate relationship 
with the FARDC has compromised its mission to curtail this violence and further fueled 
suspicion in the eastern Congolese population. From the outset, the failure of MONUSCO 
(formerly MONUC), consisting of the largest-ever UN peacekeeping mission deployed, to 
communicate its mandate to civilians would foster a climate of mistrust, exacerbated by language 
and cultural barriers between foreign peacekeepers and the local population (Reynaert 28). 
Additionally, Autesserre (2010), in her analysis of the UN peacebuilding mission during the 
years 2003-2006, argues that the failure to curb violence and achieve stability in the eastern 
regions can be attributed in part to a dominant, peacebuilding paradigm that located the causes of 
local conflict in insufficient state authority and Congolese’ “propensity to violence”, rather than 
complex social, political, economic, and historical contexts of the communities concerned. 
Equipped with no local conflict resolution capacities, MONUSCO has consequently permitted 
and in ways exacerbated fighting, massacres, and human rights violations, instilling a deep 
 
mistrust of UN-affiliated forces in civilian populations that reverberates today in the opinions of 
local people; one farmer from Kididiwe interviewed by the Congo Research Group (2016) for 
their research on the Beni massacres noted “we have the impression that the FARDC and 
MONUSCO are more concerned with their own interests rather than protecting the local 
population”34 (18). A cartoon by a Congolese cartoonist Kash Thembo, presented by Alcayna-
Stevens (2020), captures the anger civilians feel at the inaction of UN peacekeepers in the face of 
attacks by the ADF, who remain protected by Congolese police and scratch their heads as to why 
the community is angry (Appendix A).  
MONUSCO’s negative political connotations with the FARDC, along with chronic 
neglect of the region, have combined to considerably hamper the deliverance of medical aid, 
primarily by humanitarian actors, to those who most in need it in the East. The continual 
renewing of MONUSCO’s mandate, with recent ones such as United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 2098 and the new mandate in 2018, have preserved a deep entanglement of 
humanitarian, military, and political forces in the eastern Congo, leading to a lack of trust in UN 
medical resources. And independent humanitarian actors’ commitments to neutrality are 
routinely compromised by the frequent presence of FARDC soldiers in healthcare settings; 
MONUSCO forces’ failure to prosecute or hold accountable FARDC soldiers responsible for 
ongoing violence have hindered NGOs’ access to those most in need, notably due to the mistrust 
fostered in locals (Ponthieu et al. 2014). This distrust has also resulted from civilians’ 
understanding of NGO personnel’s ideological proximity with military forces, who often 
necessarily accompany humanitarians for protection. These realities demonstrate how the UN is 
working in ways that undermine the work of the few NGOs in the eastern region struggling to 
 
34 “Nous avons l’impression que les FARDC et la MONUSCO songent plus à leurs propres intérêts qu’à protéger la 
population locale” 
 
operate and tend to the intersecting humanitarian crises (refugee, medical, etc.) amidst minimal 
funding and negative perceptions. Ebola has joined a list of other epidemic diseases that have 
proven more deadly than the former: during the same period that Ebola has been present, over 
13,400 cases of cholera have occurred, mainly concentrated in North and South Kivu, a 
concurrent measles outbreak has killed over 6,00035 in the country, worsened by low vaccination 
coverage in vulnerable communities, malnutrition, and weak public health systems, and five 
separate outbreaks of vaccine-derived polio have occurred (“Cholera...Week 27”; 
“Deaths...6000”; Mbaeyi et al. 2019). Public health in the DRC, and especially in the East where 




















35 An article posted by MSF in December 2019 noted that almost 10,000 measles cases were reported in one week in 
November, and 73% of the deaths of these cases are of children under 5  https://www.msf.org/efforts-tackle-deadly-
drc-measles-epidemic-remain-insufficient  
 
Chapter 3: Convergent Insecurities—Unpacking “Resistance” to the Ebola Riposte in the 
Eastern DRC 
EVD in the Eastern DRC: Distinctive Challenges and the Structure of the Riposte Ebola 
The tenth EVD outbreak in the DRC on-record seems to follow a trend of heightened 
Ebolavirus (EBV) spillovers in human populations in the Congo basin region in the past two 
decades, which has amounted to a fragmentary landscape of Ebola knowledge and preparedness 
levels. Significant rates of deforestation, and also greater contact between humans and natural 
reservoirs of the virus due to human activities integral to economic and physical survival, 
including hunting, agriculture, and gold-digging, have been used to explain the increased 
frequency of EBV spillovers since 1994 (Muyembe-Tamfum et al. 2012). Appendix B (CDC, 
2017) reveals the outbreaks in the DRC on record through 2017. While outbreaks have expanded 
knowledge of the disease in the isolated regions where they have occurred, no national Ebola 
guidelines exist, while outbreak responses led predominantly by the state and foreign 
organizations such as the WHO have marginalized local agency and knowledge in responses. 
One Western aid worker from the American NGO Mercy Corps shared with the author the 
difficulties in providing sustainable Ebola preparedness training in the Congo as opposed to 
Guinea, a function of the Congo’s high rates of displacement and mobility, and the largely ad 
hoc Ebola responses that perpetuate dependence of the DRC on foreign resources and expertise 
(Personal interview 1).  
Occurring in a region that has seen ongoing armed conflict, prolonged, intersecting 
humanitarian “emergencies” and high rates of mobility across porous borders, the DRC’s tenth 
outbreak has sustained a top-down, securitized response consistently framed by emergency. 
Appendix C (CDC, 2020), reveals the location of North Kivu province and the other provinces 
 
and their respective health zones concerned by the current epidemic along the country’s eastern 
border. Since it was declared on August 1, 2018, the outbreak has been classified as a Grade 3 
emergency, triggering the highest level of mobilization from the WHO, as well as an activation 
of the UN’s Humanitarian System-wide Scale-up (“Ebola...Concern”). This first-ever 
deployment of WHO personnel on-the-ground, FARDC soldiers from the Ministry of Health 
(MoH), and various humanitarian actors have led to a rapprochement between public health, 
humanitarian and security sectors that has evolved throughout the different iterations of 
emergency labeled by the response. On 17 July 2019, when the epidemic was declared a PHEIC, 
a decision influenced in part by the confirmation of a case of Ebola in Goma, a “gateway to the 
rest of DRC and the world” (“Emergency...Congo”). This emergency framing has been 
accompanied by a securitized, at times militarized approach taken in the riposte. A Western 
nurse working for MSF on-the-ground in the DRC expressed to me in a conversation their 
disapproval of the pervasive use of the word ‘riposte’ in reference to the Congo and West Africa 
cases, which for them has translated into militaristic tactics: forced removals of suspected cases 
from their homes, and also threats toward individuals who have not complied with safe burial 
practices through shooting into the air and chasing them (Personal interview 2). 
Countering the ‘Counter-Attack’: Contextualizing Different Forms of “Resistance” to 
Healthcare Workers, ETCs, and Other Elements of the Riposte  
 
As touched upon in the introduction, the word “resistance” has a tendency to advance 
skewed portrayals of individuals responding to the enforcement of certain public health 
measures, which has encouraged the author to use alternative terms. The politically charged 
nature of the term “resistance” can mask individuals’ efforts to survive in the face of perceived 
threats to their lives. During the West Africa Ebola outbreak, media discourse on violence 
 
perpetrated by young Sierra Leonean men against medical teams and government security forces 
linked these acts with “resistance”, explained solely for its impact on disease containment 
efforts, rather than the harsh repression from armed forces and social and structural factors 
contributing to them36 (McLean 2019). During the West Africa outbreak and also the current one 
in the DRC, the word “resistance” appears frequently in WHO and humanitarian situation reports 
without any formal definition of the term or methodological form of measuring it, which as 
Abramowitz (2017) notes, leaves the impression that affected communities are irrational and 
noncompliant. Furthermore, Calain and Poncin (2015) problematize the use of a single word to 
encompass all community responses, suggesting the importance of distinguishing between 
violent and non-violent community responses when examining the DRC case, while 
contextualizing both of them. Hence, in this analysis, the word “resistance” will be substituted 
with the term “reluctance” to be used in reference to community members’ non-violent refusal to 
accept Ebola containment efforts; “reluctance” will be distinguished from violent forms of 
aggression against the Ebola response, which will be explicitly identified as overt, physical 
actions. For purposes of concision, the word “resistance” will at times be used in quotation 
marks, reminding the reader of the term’s imperfections and inviting reflection on more fitting 
ones.  
The goals of the following section are to situate both violent attacks and cases of 
reluctance toward the riposte in the explanatory models behind them, which help illuminate 
sentiments of mistrust that reflect socio-political histories and realities of the affected 
communities37. Surveys of residents in Beni and Butembo, North Kivu done by Vinck et al. 
 
36  
37 Hewlett and Hewlett (2008) employ child-caregiver attachments as an analogy for the relations civilians feel with 
local governments, the state, and international actors; this comparison helps explain the challenges encountered by 
 
(2019) in 2018 revealed only 31.5% of respondents to trust local authorities to represent their 
interests. While not representative of all of the eastern DRC, this one example suggests 
underlying apprehension and suspicion toward the intentions of different authorities that has 
generated “circulating narratives” and “alternative explanations”. These terms, advanced by 
Alcayna-Stevens (2020), better convey the accumulated meanings from histories and experiences 
of exploitation and violence in local populations38 that have been resurrected and reproduced 
through the current Ebola response. While reluctance, overt hostilities, and alternative 
explanations are not unanimous amongst heterogeneous communities, their recurrence deserves 
analysis for the ways in which they bring to light systemic issues facing them, such as the 
ongoing NSAG violence3940. This discussion will bring to light certain patterns in the outbreak 
through examining several recurring narratives arising from affected communities that could be 
behind the reluctance and acts of physical violence of said communities. 
“First the kidnappings...then the massacres...now Ebola”: Ebola as Politics 
 
 
Ebola responders who oftentimes lack the trust of local populations because of their neglecting to provide the latter 
sensitive, responsive, and consistent healthcare, and thus demonstrated concern for their well-being. 
38 As opposed to such terms as ‘misinformation’ and ‘rumours’ which imply ignorance and irrationality. 
39 Armed group presence in the region affected by Ebola has also considerably heightened the insecurity faced by 
response workers. As expressed to the author in an interview with a PhD student in political science with expertise 
in the Eastern Congo, intelligence on armed group motives is critically lacking in the response due to the constantly 
shifting alliances between groups and other factors. The identities of armed assailants in ETCs and other perpetrators 
of violent attacks often remain obscured and thus it remains difficult to know exactly whether armed groups share 
responsibility with civilians for such attacks (Personal interview 3). Nonetheless, a distinction should be made 
between the agendas of armed groups and those of civilians responsible for attacks: while the former may be 
motivated by economic opportunism or ideological reasons, the latter are encouraged by narratives on Ebola and the 
riposte that reveal important messages.  
40 In public health emergency discourse, any factor obstructing or complicating response efforts is generally referred 
to as a “disruptive event”, recognized mostly for its epidemiological implications, and in many ways removed from 
the contexts in which it arose. In the high insecurity context of the eastern DRC, attention must be paid to the ways 
in which discourse on the outbreak conflates acts of so-called “resistance” to various elements of the Ebola response 
with other security incidents associated with armed groups, and also other acts of political resistance of 
communities.   
 
 One of the most common themes surfacing from the community feedback data from the 
beginning of the outbreak to the present is the belief of Ebola being instrumentalized as a 
political tool, both by the Congolese government and by the international community. For some 
of those living in North and South Kivu and Ituri provinces, the arrival of Ebola in a region that 
according to them has been the target of mass killings and relentless violence, is no coincidence. 
WhatsApp and local media messages circulating in the second month of the outbreak revealed 
beliefs among community members that Ebola represented another weapon deployed by the 
forces responsible for the continual mass killings and kidnappings in the eastern region (Sweet 
and Bedford 2019). Civilians’ own awareness of the national army forces’ complicity in the 
murders and crimes transpiring in their environments renders this interpretation of Ebola 
implicitly political, linking the emergence of the disease with the violence of the state, and in the 
process revealing questions about belonging and citizenship in a region long neglected by the 
national government.  
In addition to implicating the civilians’ own government, narratives arising from 
community surveys as recent as November of 2019 have viewed Ebola as a disease concocted by 
“whites”, and deliberately introduced into populations in the eastern DRC to “eliminate 
Africans”, a strategy undertaken in collusion with the Congolese state (Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 
2019). All of these stories that convey the political weaponization of Ebola seem redolent of 
colonized Congolese’, including the woman healer Maria N’Koi’s, own depictions of sleeping 
sickness as a form of biological warfare indissociable from the conquest of the Europeans, thus 
linking the deaths and suffering Ebola to both internal and external aggression (Hunt 2016; 
Lyons 1992).  
 
Regarding the power of these narratives to provoke action, reports also highlighted the 
unscrupulous strategies of some local politicians to spread these narratives, exploiting their 
communities’ own distrust of authorities to galvanize them against the Ebola response and incite 
violence, thus prolonging the Ebola outbreak for their own personal gain. Important to remember 
here is the pervasiveness of such realities as corruption, nepotism, and embezzlement in the 
DRC, especially in rural areas where local leaders must forego salaries for lengthy periods, thus 
encouraging them to capitalize on the access and benefits that their positions afford them in order 
to survive (Alcayna-Stevens 2018). These clarifications are not to excuse the immoral actions of 
local elites but rather to situate them within the socioeconomic context of the Ebola response.  
The fact that these alternative explanations began to propagate throughout community 
circles, due to local political manipulation or not, at the same time that attacks by community 
members occurred against humanitarian convoys in the first couple of months of the outbreak, 
suggests the types of motivations that could be behind such actions. Furthermore, despite an 
observed decrease in the circulation of these political suspicions in media and elsewhere, 
controversy surrounding the exclusion of two communities affected by Ebola from voting in the 
national elections in December 2018 seemed to confirm some residents’ beliefs in the political 
origins of Ebola, an event which could be connected with the series of violent attacks against 
several ETCs that occurred from late December 2018 through March of 2019. 
This decision of the Congolese government to postpone elections in Beni town, Beni 
territory, and Butembo under the pretext of avoiding further spread of Ebola in these territories 
fueled anger and resentment in these regions, which are all opposition strongholds to the 
government in Kinshasa. The resulting animosity seems to have been directed toward public 
health officials who were implicitly linked with the MoH, and thus the government, which 
 
manifested in the destruction of ETCs in Beni and Oicha and a spike in violence during the early 
weeks of January in 2019 (Wells et al., 2019). Nine additional attacks on ETCs through the end 
of March 2019 could also be attributed to political skepticism of the disease’s presence, 
especially due to the use of Ebola as a campaign strategy for the legislative elections in March, 
thus sowing even more doubt as to the apolitical nature of the outbreak (Bardosh et al. Feb-May 
2019). 
“Ebola as business”: an epidemic of predation and opportunity 
Interwoven with the politicization of Ebola narratives is the perception of Ebola as a 
“business”, relating the intentionality of the Congolese government as well as national and 
foreign aid workers, doctors and scientists who all have economic interests in introducing and 
sustaining the outbreak. Responding to the spike in presence of outsiders (Westerners, non-
Congolese Africans, and those from Kinshasa) whose relations with the eastern Congo have 
historically been predicated on predation, some locals have implicated foreign personnel in the 
response who seem to be reaping the financial rewards from people’s affliction with Ebola, and 
overall continued suffering. These sentiments reflect in WhatsApp messages sent during the first 
few months of 2019, whose senders demanded questions centering around “why do the 
healthcare people want to get rich off the blood of others while they know the truth about Ebola? 
(Bardosh et al. Jun-Aug 2019). Denouncing the rampant corruption that they see in multiple 
levels of authority, locals as part of an historical trend see the state and the international arenas as 
intimately linked; viewing Ebola as a scheme of the government to obtain more outside funding 
with a humanitarian façade, individuals also are reacting to what they see as a corrupt state 
whose sudden attention to the eastern regions, piqued by the Ebola epidemic, reflect intertwined 
political and economic motives lacking any sincere concern for its people. And in July 2019, the 
 
resignation of the DRC’s health minister Oly Ilunga, and his subsequent arrest in September 
under allegations of mismanagement of some $4.3 million allocated for the Ebola response, only 
cemented individuals’ suspicions of the corruption intrinsic to the international-national response 
apparatus. These feelings seem to have propelled verbal threats from local populations which 
demonstrate resentment toward response teams for not hiring “their people”, manifesting in 
posters such as that hung up in Butembo (Appendix D) which reads: 
We inform all involved persons in the EBOLA infierno that we don’t want them anymore 
in the following places…And everywhere where they are housed, we know. We give 
them 48 hours to decamp, or else they will come to know who we are. They just have to 
remember what happened to VUHOVI center. (ed: Local name of Katwa ETC) (Wells et 
al. 9). 
This reference to the Katwa ETC, which was previously destroyed in an attack, suggests how 
this anti-outsider sentiment could be transformed into subsequent physical acts of violence 
toward response teams and ETCs.           
Grasping the “Ebola as enterprise” belief of some locals requires understanding how this 
health emergency response, and the concomitant, massive influx of aid workers and resources 
into poor communities, serve as reminders of the deep structural inequalities between “locals” 
and “foreigners”, and the convergence of insecurities between these two groups. In vast areas of 
rural DRC, systemic poverty remains firmly entrenched, with the average household living on 
less than $1 per day; hunger and undernourishment have become quotidian realities for folks 
whose livelihoods depend on agriculture and hunting, as crop harvests can easily fail, while wild 
animals have greatly diminished over the years due to the intensification of the bushmeat trade 
following the civil war years (Alcayna-Stevens 2018). Consequently, a sudden and exceptionally 
large economic response in this socioeconomic context inevitably serves to reinforce economic 
disparities between rural and semi-rural Congolese and national and international response 
 
workers. In this outbreak, inequalities between civilian populations and responders, visible 
through the appearance of aid workers such as in the clothes they wear and the vehicles they 
drive in, as well as in the hotels and more affluent compounds they live in which separate them 
from locals, contributes to the latter’s resentment toward foreigners, who seem to be profiting 
from the response. The PhD student whose research interests focus on the eastern DRC and who 
has contributed to several of the SSHAP reports shared with the author that the physical 
separation between response workers and locals, while necessary because of legitimate security 
concerns that threaten the former’s response capacities, and lives, inevitably fuels mistrust of 
locals towards the anti-Ebola personnel who are protected from the dangers the former continue 
to face (Personal interview 3).  
The resulting distanciation felt between populations affected by the outbreak and those 
part of the response have affected local perceptions and attitudes toward the Ebola control 
measures, such as vaccines. Surveys reveal community members’ questions: they struggle to 
reconcile the expensive response vehicles rented by response teams with the lack of adequate 
vaccines to dole out to affected populations, as well as why response teams were so often 
accompanied by armed forces (Bardosh et al. Feb-May 2019). Duffield’s (2012) theorization of 
the bunkerization of aid helps convey how foreign aid workers’ insulation from the quotidian 
economic and physical insecurities faced by local populations fuel a schism felt between the 
former and the latter. In an era where the aid industry continues to expand into increasingly 
insecure environments, yet simultaneously recede from them through segregating itself from 
populations it is serving, aid workers themselves have come to willingly or unwillingly operate 
within a paradigm that relies upon risk and insecurity, rather than effectively reducing it; these 
“postmodernist calls for resilience and the acceptance of risk as an opportunity for enterprise and 
 
reinvention” seems to connect with local populations’ perceptions of the ways in which the 
Ebola response represents a continual form of exploitation of the eastern Congo and people’s 
suffering for outsiders’ own benefits (Duffield 2012). The frictions between the (in)security of 
responders and the lived insecurity of local populations have likely contributed to mistrust, in an 
environment where local economic and social realities have been shaped by the response. 
Lack of transparency surrounding the Ebola vaccine, eligibility for it, and the apparent 
benefits that accompany it has generated alternative explanations amongst community members 
about the economic motives that could be behind the Ebola response. Recurrent in surveys 
throughout the outbreak have been requests to expand the vaccination program and immunize all 
members of the population rather than what seems to be certain members of society. Community 
members claim that the ring vaccination strategy seems biased in favor of those involved in the 
response, and local political and economic elites who “profit” from the vaccine (Bardosh et al. 
Feb-May 2019). Survey responses as recent as November of 2019 reveal how getting vaccinated 
is perceived as giving into “Ebola business”: “I have been told by my pastor that it is a sin to 
have the vaccine. I do not listen to the Ebola business, I listen to my pastor so I do not sin for 
taking a fake vaccine” (Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 2019). Perceptions of injustice related to the 
vaccine also reflect in locals’ questions as to the status vaccinated individuals seem to be 
granted: “Why do you only give food to vaccinated contacts?” (Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 2019). In 
communities where hunger and undernourishment are common, benefits concomitant with 
vaccination such as the procurement of food could fuel skepticism in communities through 
seemingly devaluing the lives of those who are refused access to the vaccine, and also those who, 
as will be discussed in the next section, “resist” it.  
 
Grasping the extent of economic insecurity in the provinces affected by the Ebola 
outbreak helps understand how the arrival of the disease and the response it has triggered has 
influenced a simultaneous resistance to and engagement with the riposte that nuances the solely 
external source of aggression associated with it. The same Western nurse who expressed 
criticism of the militaristic framing and execution of the response also shared with the author that 
while “resistance” from communities is prevalent, it manifests alongside an impulse in some to 
capitalize on the economic benefits that associating with the Ebola response could bring them, 
and thus welcome a prolonging of the outbreak (Personal interview 2). While some of this 
reaction is a product of local politicians’ opportunism exhibited through their purposeful 
spreading of circulating narratives to preserve the epidemic and get a piece of the cake, it also 
must be read as a reflection of the economic insecurities that inhere within local realities in the 
eastern DRC. Youths in Goma were apparently once reported expressing their hope that Ebola 
would arrive in their city as it would open up new labor and employment opportunities in the 
response41 (Alcayna-Stevens 2020). And in this environment, where individuals vie for 
employment, and thus economic well-being, the recruitment of hundreds of locals for contact 
tracing has inexorably exacerbated tensions within communities. Indeed, in July of 2019, two 
local Ebola responders were killed by their neighbours, due to the latter’s allegedly envying the 
former for having found employment in the response (Maxmen 2019). Yet envy also seems 
accompanied by mistrust, as surveys demonstrate strong resentment toward local HCWs and 
their alleged complicity in the “Ebola business”, which allegedly encompasses the political 
 
41 Alcayna-Stevens (2020) demonstrates with her ethnographic research conducted in post-Ebola contexts in the 
western equatorial regions of the DRC after the seventh (2014) and ninth (2017) Ebola outbreaks, how people of all 
ages and professions sought to gain work from the epidemics. In underlining these more dynamic ways in which 
local communities interact with the presence of Ebola and the response helps, as the author explains, nuance 
understanding of the ways in which epidemics impact local social fabrics and politics, and depicts “Ebola Business” 
less as a modern imperial system in which local actors retain no power or ability to react to the circumstances they 
face. 
 
agendas of exterminating the eastern Congolese populations42 (World Vision 2019, cited in 
Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 2019). These aggravated social tensions have resulted from locals’ 
contributions to rather than resistance to anti-Ebola efforts, adding to the dynamic ways in which 
local populations have responded to the changes brought about by the riposte. Seen by many 
community members as an apparent site of capitalist production, the epidemic seems to, like 
those that occurred in Equateur province studied by Alcayna-Stevens (2020), hold the potential 
for “profit-making” and in turn deepening economic inequalities through enriching those already 
in wealthy and privileged positions43 (22). 
Reluctance and “Dangerous Bodies”: Oscillations Between Adaptation and Fear 
According to some response workers and media depictions, from the economic 
inequalities created and in many places exacerbated by the response in local communities, a 
moral distinction has arisen between those who contribute to Ebola containment efforts and those 
who “resist” them. In a high insecurity context like the DRC, a discourse of heroism and bravery 
seen in the West Africa Ebola outbreak that lauded those response personnel for their work has 
emerged in a more pronounced form to praise HCWs, yet also many of the unsung heroes of the 
response including local HCW, as well as non-healthcare-related community members (Alcayna-
Stevens 2020); for example, a journalist and NGO practitioner working for ALIMA emphasized 
to the author the integral roles that taxi drivers and janitors have played in surveillance for the 
Ebola response (Personal interview 4). While their efforts should not go unnoticed, they also 
 
42 Locals not comprising the response have spoken out against what they see as the complicity of locals enlisted in 
the response, the “Ebola Business”: “They have swallowed the money of the enemy who wants to exterminate us” 
and "A nurse who used to receive $100 a month now has $100 a day. Does this one really want the epidemic to 
end?” (World Vision 2019, cited in Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 2019). 
43 In this way, “it is the labor of sick and suffering bodies which generates value” (Alcayna-Stevens 2020: 22). 
Community members in both Equateur province and in the Eastern DRC seem to make an implicit connection 
between their suffering and the profiting of international, national, and local response workers. 
 
should not be analyzed without considering how their elevation, along with that of HCW, above 
others, could be giving rise to a similar dichotomy of “Ebola heroes” and “dangerous bodies” as 
adopted by Enria (2017) in her research in a Sierra Leonean village. What she found to be the 
intimacy and reinforcing natures of “engagement” and “containment” logics in the response 
paradigm in Sierra Leone seem to operate in the eastern DRC, where the response has shown 
high militarization produced by the police and armed forces who are oftentimes the same figures 
responsible for community engagement (Personal interview 2). Almost inevitably there emerges 
a contrast between those who dutifully adapt themselves to response measures and those who 
“resist” them (oftentimes out of rational fear and distrust), labeled as recalcitrant, rebellious, 
dangerous, and needing to be contained themselves44. 
The previous use of force by the army and police with civilian populations demonstrating 
reluctance to comply with containment measures, actually leading to some civilian deaths, 
provides an extreme example of a source of the fear instilled in community members by 
elements of the response which underpin reluctance. This fear seems to reflect in the acquired 
meanings of response protocols, such as the vaccine, in everyday language; research discussed 
by Alcayna-Stevens (2020) that was carried out by Translators Without Borders in Beni, one of 
the Ebola hotspots in North Kivu, revealed locals’ understanding of the ring vaccination 
technique as a boxing ring; rather than associated with protection and good health, getting 
vaccinated thus has become in some people’s eyes another arm of the response against the 
civilians that it is professed to protect (Bagnetto 2019). While certainly not generalizable to all of 
 
44 This article written by the Director-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Ghebreyesus, unintentionally advances this 
dichotomy. While rightfully recognizing the intrepid and committed HCWs from local communities who have put 
themselves on the frontlines, who despite security risks are “heroes” and “want to return to the field”, those 
responsible for attacks are “culprits” from communities to which increased security presence is an immediate 
answer. His reasonable denouncement of an attack committed by Mai Mai militia seems to conflate armed group 
motivations with those of civilians. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/dec/10/ebola-
responders-face-deadly-attacks-we-must-step-up-security-in-drc  
 
the populations in the provinces affected, this mistrust and fear of the vaccination help trace a 
line of continuity from colonial times to the present. Indeed, survey responses as recent as 
November 2019 in which individuals affirm the “deadly” and “poisonous” nature of the vaccine 
seem to bear a resemblance to the widespread and long-lived “fear that the invasive needle 
actually caused the disease” observed amongst African populations during the Belgian sleeping 
sickness campaigns in the early 1900s (Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 2019; Lyons 189). While the 
historical parallels know their limits, as explanations surrounding the needle today manifest in a 
reluctance to seek out the vaccine and medical care rather than the flights of people from the 
feared ‘injection campaigns’ seen in the 1910s, they are nonetheless important for understanding 
how the past has informed or diverged from the present. 
In addition, a link between the vaccine, the perceived self-interest of the West, and the 
devaluing of the lives of Africans also surfaces from SSHAP reports which reveal some 
community members’ dismay upon discovering the experimental nature of the vaccine. A 
community outreach worker from Beni in September 2019 expressed: 
We were told that the vaccine is still in the experimental phase, and I will never 
forget that word in my life. When I checked in the dictionary, I realised that I had 
become a guinea pig, and I immediately had doubts...I had become part of a test, 
and a test can fail (Novetta Nov. 2019, cited in Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 2019). 
 
This worker’s comments touch upon a sensitive history in which African populations and those 
of African descent in the West have been used as test subjects for research purposes and exposed 
to potentially dangerous vaccines and pathogens45. This impression of locals of research and 
scientific results taking precedence for response workers over health improvements and saving 
 
45 The Tuskegee syphilis experiment conducted by the U.S. Public Health Service from 1932-72 in which Black 
males were purposefully infected with syphilis to study its effects left untreated comes to mind here. In addition, 
recent remarks amidst the Covid-19 outbreak made by two French doctors who suggested testing a vaccine for the 
coronavirus in Africa have sparked waves of criticism, and spurred the circulation of the message “Africa is not a 
laboratory” around social media and other media outlets. 
 
lives has also appeared in other reactions, such as that of a prominent civil society organisation, 
La Lucha, which has claimed that the second vaccine is a conflict of interest as it indeed “favours 
research instead of saving lives”46 (Novetta, November 2019, cited in Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 
2019). 
Difficult to disentangle from this fear of the vaccine is that of the doctor and the ETC, 
which have been a defining feature of the outbreak, and which also share historical similarities 
with the colonial era. Additional research discussed by Alcayna-Stevens (2020) and conducted 
by Translators Without Borders in Beni revealed how the language of violence and combat 
inheres within representations of the doctor: those who have been cured of Ebola are referred to 
as “vainqueurs”, or winners, thus implying that patients who leave the ETC have emerged 
victorious as they are presumed to have “had a fight with the doctor and won” (Bagnetto 2019); 
this interpretation of visits with the doctors as confrontations rather than as relations of healing 
and empathic care undoubtedly feed into a fear and avoidance of the ETC, which have remained 
rather constant since the beginning of the outbreak. Connotations of the ETC as a “death trap” 
recur in survey responses, which can largely be attributed to communities’ observations that 
many of those entering ETCs never return. Survey responses indicate circulating fears of ETCs 
related to circulating narratives of dismemberment and injection of lethal substances as causes of 
death, and subsequent organ extraction all occurring in the treatment center upon a patient’s 
 
46 These sentiments reveal a tension between natural science and social science research, and more largely, 
biomedical versus ecological approaches toward addressing epidemics raised by Adams (2013). Social scientists 
have critiqued so-called successful health interventions, noting that although they may be successful according to 
some metrics, they often produce unintended consequences that make their overall success ambiguous. Thus seems 
to be the case in the current outbreak, where trials have proven the efficacies of the Ebola vaccine yet have 
exacerbated distrust and perceived inequalities in societies, hampering the response. This reality demonstrates the 
inadequacies of scientific, biomedical approaches to complex, intersecting issues Ebola has revealed and against 
which it evolves. While the experimental vaccine was deployed in order to save lives under a “compassionate use” 
protocol, the lack of transparency surrounding vaccine eligibility has fueled a logic in the eyes of locals that suspects 
an unsettling trend also discussed by Adams (2013) in which experimental research has prioritized the production of 
statistics over the actual medical goal of protecting as many people as possible from getting infected with Ebola. 
 
arrival (Bardosh et al. Nov 2018-Feb 2019; Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 2019). Throughout the 
course of the outbreak, a significant factor in the low survival ratios of patients admitted to 
receive treatment has been the prevalence of late presentation at ETCs, reflecting a profound fear 
of evidencing the infection of loved ones, which seems to feed a cycle of low survival ratios and 
consequent fear of the ETCs; these delays in reporting the infection of oneself or of loved ones 
seem to connect with African responses to the Belgian colonial campaign against sleeping 
sickness, when as a general trend if Africans noticed a victim to be at an advanced stage of the 
disease, they brought them to the lazaret (Lyons 195); the consequent association of the lazaret 
as a conduit from life to “the cemetery” surely fueled African “resistance” to the practices of 
isolation and hospitalisation observed until the 1930s (Lyons 191).  
At the same time, studying aspects of the sleeping sickness campaigns may help 
illuminate some of the factors underpinning reluctance observed in the eastern provinces today. 
In regards to those Africans who cooperated with the sleeping sickness campaign and seemed 
supportive of the lazaret in the early 1900s, Lyons (1992) offers the explanation that when 
endorsed by respected authority figures, aspects of European medicine were more easily 
assimilated by Africans (195). This historical analysis, when compared with the current outbreak 
in the Congo and the distrust of the vaccine, the ETC, doctors, and other personnel involved in 
the response, begs the question of how local authorities could be to blame for such suspicion. 
Indeed, survey reports reveal church and political leaders to be deliberately spreading 
misinformation about the ETCs, thus sculpting the optics through which civilians interpret the 
response and its features (Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 2019). Mistrust of the vaccines, ETCs and 
medical professionals in some locals appears a consequence of beliefs informed by some local 
leaders, as well as civilians’ own experiences with foreigners, the police, and histories of 
 
exploitation; here, local suspicion toward a national-international Ebola response should not be 
evaluated as evidence of cultural stasis from the colonial era, yet rather a response to the 
continuation of their socioeconomic plights and insecurity that has been largely facilitated and 
ignored by the international-national forces who are embodied by the response. Considering how 
some reluctance toward the Ebola vaccine contrasts with general acceptance and voiced desire 
for vaccines and medications for other diseases suggests the particular ways in which Ebola and 
the unprecedented mobilization of resources it has engendered in the eastern region response 
have become understood by civilians. 
“You will leave when Ebola does…but we will still be here, slowly dying from the diseases that 
have always killed us”: the Suspicion of Urgency in the Eastern DRC 
 
During the sleeping sickness campaign, at the same time as significant reluctance toward 
the vaccine and other elements of trypanosomiasis occurred, Africans in fact sought out vaccines 
for other diseases, including yaws and syphilis (Lyons 191); this separation between the disease 
of focus for the Belgian campaign and other diseases and health challenges such as maternal 
health affecting Congolese’ daily lives, seems to reverberate in the eastern Congo today: the 
fixation of the national and international teams on Ebola, as well as the specific form their 
response has taken, have associated Ebola with a particular set of experiences and have inspired 
many questions amongst civilians as to why Ebola has elicited such urgency alongside other 
diseases and issues that are resulting in far greater illness and deaths in the region. 
One anecdote proves telling of this mismatch between the international community’s 
priorities channeled through the riposte and those of populations in the Eastern DRC. Trish 
Newport, MSF Emergency Coordinator, received an enlightening answer from a Congolese staff 
 
member in the DRC in response to her question as to why there was much anger directed at the 
humanitarian response to Ebola. Her reply was as follows: 
My husband was killed in a massacre in Beni. At that time, all I wanted was some 
organisation to come and protect us from the killings, but no international 
organisation came. I have had three children die of malaria. No international 
organisation has ever come to work in this area to make sure we have healthcare 
or clean water. But now Ebola arrives and all the organisations come, because 
Ebola gives them money. If you cared about us, you would ask us what our 
priorities are. My priorities are security and making sure my children don't die 
from malaria or diarrhoea. My priority is not Ebola – that is your priority 
(“After...MSF”). 
 
This Congolese staff member’s story is by no means unique to her, and presents common 
grievances that are behind much of the distrust of communities and their observations of self-
interest in the riposte. Suspicion in these populations becomes inevitable in the face of the 
international community’s inactions in the face of security issues as well as diseases that have 
consistently faced civilians and constituted a prolonged state of emergency that has failed to 
sound a loud enough alarm. As of 2018, malaria constituted the number one cause of death in the 
DRC, followed closely by lower respiratory infections, neonatal disorders, and TB 
(“Democratic...Health”). The DRC has also seen a concurrent measles epidemic, that by June 
2019 was reported to have exceeded the death toll of the ongoing Ebola epidemic. As of April 
2020, more than 342,000 people had been infected and 6,400 had died, compared to 3456 
infections and 2266 deaths in the current Ebola outbreak to date (“Deaths...6000”). 
Overall, the sudden influx of personnel and aid into affected cities and villages, has been 
seen as a development not propelled not by a “humanitarian” concern for the populations 
affected by a deadly disease, but by an ingrained fear of Ebola spreading beyond the eastern 
DRC, and notably to the West. A specific suspicion understood by the author in community 
feedback, that the measles vaccine used by responders is not for measles but in actuality for 
 
Ebola, provides an entry point into understanding some civilians’ skepticism toward the entire 
response apparatus and the motives underpinning it (Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 2019). Thinking 
about the low threshold of panic of the West when it comes to high-profile diseases such as 
Ebola discussed in the first chapter, and the ways in which the media’s sensationalist depictions 
of the disease fuel this fear, community members are critiquing a response they see as motivated 
by the impulse to protect the West rather than improve the general health and well-being of 
populations affected. While this security-driven motivation for a global health intervention is not 
new, its imposition onto the eastern DRC has touched upon an especially raw feeling of neglect 
of locals, exacerbated by years of resounding silence and indifference of both the Congolese 
government and the international community, in the face of continual massacres, and deadly 
disease outbreaks.  
“You will leave when Ebola does…but we will still be here, slowly dying from the 
diseases that have always killed us”, a researcher has heard from the eastern Congo, a message 
that encapsulates the intersecting economic and political arguments that figure in alternative 
explanations, and that seem to retain veracity (Nguyen 2019). All of this analysis of the various 
types of reasoning underlying distrust of populations of the anti-Ebola efforts is certainly not to 
discount the significant fear and anxieties populations have of Ebola and the threat it poses to 
their lives, families, and livelihoods. Yet understanding how some are rationalizing the riposte 
helps glean important insight into how lived realities in the eastern Congo have been and 
continue to be shaped by particular histories of health and basic insecurity that are inevitably in 
contention with the insecurity paradigms of those responding to the outbreak. The optics through 
which some civilians have come to understand Ebola have been sculpted by the riposte, and begs 
the question of how, as the epidemic seems to be “ending”, the inextricable link between the 
 
disease and the specific, and now expected response it triggers, will have a legacy in future 





















Chapter 4: Interrogating Urgency Amidst Chronic Neglect: Learning from Disjuncture Between 
Local and (Inter)National Perspectives and Recommendations for Future Ebola Outbreaks in the 
Eastern DRC 
Teasing Out Fears and Blame in a Convergence of “Crises” in the Eastern DRC 
As the Ebola workers in the eastern DRC continue navigating various forms of 
uncertainty, the prospects of an “end” to a declared health emergency require understanding how 
the West’s sentiments of fear and insecurity have undergirded the temporary, ad hoc approach 
that has magnified the fear and insecurity of affected community members. As Nunes (2017) 
writes, paraphrasing Philip Alcabes (2009), 
The fears that surround health issues do not just relate to their specific physical or 
clinical dimensions...disease functions as a catalyst of other fears in society—the 
fear of strangers, of technological development, of racial difference, and so on” 
(7)    
 
As a universal, evolutionarily adaptive emotion, fear, and the sense of risk that accompanies it, in 
this Ebola outbreak seem to have emerged on both sides of the epidemic response: on the one 
hand, an institutionalized fear of EVD in America and the West have combined with the DRC 
MoH’s militaristic approach to Ebola containment to create a highly securitized, top-down 
response; this structure has according to the humanitarian worker with Mercy Corps engendered 
a heavy biosecurity context governed by a “no-touch” policy with locals; contact with those from 
affected populations is strictly limited by physical distancing rules and to mainly medical 
settings, which in turn considerably constrain response workers’ abilities to connect and 
empathize with locals and learn about their communities and challenges (Personal interview 1). 
On the other hand, affected populations have “resisted” those elements of the response that 
inspire rational fear, notably white foreigners associated with colonial violence, military 
personnel that have been complicit in the routine massacres of civilians, and the perceived 
dangers of the ETC from which sick patients rarely return. Reproduced through both local and 
 
(inter)national optics, these expressions of fear and uncertainty cannot be removed from the 
profoundly unequal power dynamics that the Ebola response has surfaced and reinforced.  
These asymmetrical power relations that reflect legacies of colonialism, neocolonialism 
and continual external aggression, have demonstrated the capacities for (mostly Western) 
sentiments of fear and risk to dictate what problems actually merit attention and action in the 
eastern DRC, and thus whose lives matter47. Indeed, the sounding of the alarm in this region of 
the country through the declaration of the Ebola outbreak as a national and regional emergency 
and subsequently as a PHEIC transmitted a message of urgency that resonated with donor’s and 
some global health professionals’ fears of Ebola, and implicitly of diseases viewed as “inherently 
African”, intrinsic to the African body, to the “Other”. And as the WHO witnesses a gradual 
decline in Ebola cases and a considerably diminished threat posed by the outbreak, it faces a $20 
million funding gap which threatens to financially impede it from continuing response operations 
through the end of the outbreak (Fall 2020). This familiar trend in which the global community’s 
attention and action hinge upon the visible, tangible threat a supposed “crisis” poses to those 
outside the affected zone typifies the world’s indifference to widespread suffering in the eastern 
provinces, which remain mired in residual violence from the civil wars and prolonged 
humanitarian crisis. Yet crisis is the precise lens through which donors and the international 
community view the current outbreak as well as that of West Africa: one which externalizes the 
threat posed by Ebola, and internalizes a sense of fragility and vulnerability of the self, i e the 
 
47 Roitman’s (2012) analysis of the etymology and history of the term “crisis” proves useful; originating from the 
Ancient Greek word krinô, meaning to choose, separate, cut, to judge, the word “crisis” as it is known and used 
today connotes a sense of power, particularly to the party applying it, who deems it an apt term for the situation of 
concern. Remaining predominantly associated with the Hippocratic school, and thus immanent within a medical 
grammar, the term denoted a critical phase in which life or death was at stake due to a disease threat which justified 
an “irrevocable decision”, a “decisive judgment”, a definition which seems to hold relevance today.  
 
West (Nunes 8-9). As a result, these optics have generated mutually reinforcing discourses of 
risk and securitization.  
Structured to address a “discrete crisis event”, the riposte has in many ways perpetuated a 
short-term, reactive response model in which Ebola has distracted from, and concealed, the 
larger politico-economic “crisis” that has arguably produced greater suffering and contributed to 
the epidemic (Nunes 2017). Fassin (2012) captures the humanitarian lens through which foreign, 
particularly Western countries respond to complex situations that transpire elsewhere:   
Our way of apprehending the world derives from a process of problematization 
through which we come to describe and interpret the world in a certain way, 
bringing problems into existence and giving them specific form, and by this 
process discarding other ways of describing and interpreting reality, of 
determining and constituting what makes a problem (3). 
  
The transformation of Ebola into an emergency represents this form of problematization, which 
not only normalizes the ongoing crisis in the eastern DRC and the country more largely, but also 
conceals it48. Viewed as a health emergency rather than intimately tied to this ongoing “crisis”, 
the Ebola outbreak itself has become implicated in an “alibi” for the larger global community: a 
strategy of manipulating humanitarian assistance in place of political engagement, or in support 
of military intervention, which often removes responsibility of larger power structures for the 
perpetuation of short-term, non-sustainable aid:  
At a deeper level, this alibi buttresses the idea that crisis contexts in the 
geographic periphery – Rakhine, Eastern DRC, Haiti – are ‘shitholes’ with 
humanitarian problems to be addressed via responses that are humanitarian in 
nature (Dubois 6). 
 
 
48 As Roitman (2012) argues, crisis in contemporary times represents “a discrepancy between the world and 
knowledge of the world”, thus rendering “certain things visible and others invisible.”  
 
Dependent on an unwieldy global health governance structure that operates on this politics of 
fear and risk that perpetuates cycles of health emergencies and neglect, the WHO struggles to 
overcome this tension between brief disease containment work and longer-term health systems 
development and promotion in the DRC. Emphasizing the imperative to “transition the capacities 
built in this response toward building a stronger health system”, one which can adequately 
respond to “malaria, measles, cholera, and now Covid-19”, WHO Assistant Director-General Dr. 
Socé Fall struggles to reconcile his and other practitioners’ visions of a more equitable, just 
reality with an outside world that has long tolerated, and silenced, widespread suffering in the 
eastern DRC (Fall 2020). These populations who have now become subsumed in an 
unprecedentedly large health emergency response have not been immune to Fassin’s (2012) 
notion of “compassion fatigue”: a “wearing down of moral sentiments until they turn into 
indifference or even aggressiveness toward victims of misfortune”, a process which shifts blame 
onto those populations directly affected by the outbreak (3). 
As previous Ebola outbreaks have demonstrated, the overuse of socio-cultural factors to 
explain epidemics engender strategic blame-the-victim dynamics which remove international and 
state responsibility for the structural problems that disease crises surface. Wilkinson and Leach 
(2015) discuss how deforestation and bushmeat hunting associated with African populations 
most affected by Ebola during the West African outbreak drew disproportionate attention in 
explanations for the outbreak. Farmer (2005) elaborates on the conflation of poverty and 
inequality, consequences of structural violence, and “otherness”. This trend observed in 
scholarship as well as the media in response to a myriad number of different catastrophes 
transpiring in the “Third World”, including epidemics, thus reinforces the connection between 
the Global South and disaster and tragedy, distancing the suffering from the West that in reality 
 
is inherently linked with global structures of inequality49. Wilkinson and Leach (2015) argue that 
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa cannot be understood without establishing the context of a 
global economy and regional history that created favorable conditions for an epidemic: a 
neoliberalization of healthcare which has undermined the WHO’s mission of promoting health as 
a “global public good” and horizontal health system strengthening, civil war in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, pervasive corruption, and consequent mistrust in civilians of state and international 
actors. As Farmer concludes, and echoes Dubois, readers should heed the ways in which notions 
of culture furnish an “alibi” and distract from the roots of an epidemic (49).  
The DRC outbreak has demonstrated how mechanisms of blame toward communities 
affected most by an epidemic can hinder trust not only of civilians toward response personnel but 
also in the opposite direction, a reality which serves to remove responsibility from response 
teams and also distract from larger issues. Community perspectives gleaned from WhatsApp 
messages, local media, and social media outlets reveal frustrations when response teams attribute 
the spread of the outbreak to a lack of community buy-in, a default toward problematizing locals 
that locals themselves claim reflects stigmatizing attitudes held by response workers (Sweet et al. 
2019). A Nande youth group in Kinshasa, Cojeunak, a progressive group coordinated by youth 
themselves who have mobilized against armed group violence in the East and the complicity of 
Congolese police and armed forces have also spoken out about response teams’ condescending 
demeanors. An open letter they composed to the Minister of Public Health criticized the 
“paternalistic” views of response teams:  
And even worse, there is current trend to attribute the failure of the response to 
the community. Worryingly, some members of the response go so far as to grow 
 
49 Roitman’s (2012) discussion of how the identity and meaning of “crisis” become displaced for larger concepts 
that in turn justify it is pertinent: “Crisis is claimed, but it remains a latency; it is never itself explained because it 
allows for the further reduction of ‘crisis’ to other elements, such as capitalism, economy, politics, culture, 
subjectivity.” 
 
angry with the population and launch slurs against the community ravaged by 
violent armed conflict50 (Dianzenza 2019). 
 
These observed actions of response staff by community members suggest the insensitivities of 
some response workers to the particular lived experiences and conditions of civilians who are 
most affected by and vulnerable to Ebola, and a mistrust and violence directed in the opposite 
direction than is presented in media reports. These harsh, alleged criticisms emanating from 
response personnel prove all-the-more shocking and indicative of their ignorance, especially in 
the face of many communities who are committed to ending Ebola yet have consistently voiced 
their need of handwashing sinks, soap, clean water, disinfectants, and bathroom facilities 
(Bardosh et al. Sep-Nov 2019). The Nande youth’s letter goes further to advocate a “stigma-free” 
approach to community mobilization, in which response workers see locals as rational actors, 
oftentimes sharing the same motivations as them, and thus listening critically to them to learn 
about their realities. This familiar situation in which critical engagement with local perspectives 
becomes displaced by a dynamics of blame that problematizes populations emphasizes the 
importance of how in an epidemic response environment trust must go in both directions. 
Humanitarian Actors: Navigating the (Politicized) Militarized Riposte in the East 
Western countries’ desires for state-building in the DRC, which remain intimately linked 
with Western security concerns, rely upon a discourse of state fragility. The DRC in the West’s 
eyes typifies a “fragile state”, denoting generally “the lack of capacity and willingness to 
perform key government functions for all citizens”, yet also a deviation from the Western ideals 
of statehood and governance that renders it a security threat (OECD 2014; Aembe and Dijkzeul 
 
50 “Et le pire dans tout cela est qu’aujourd’hui, on a tendance à remettre en cause une raison diplomatique, tout en 
donnant la responsabilité de la non-maîtrise de la maladie à virus Ebola à la communauté” http://www.adiac-
congo.com/content/maladie-virus-ebola-les-jeunes-nande-de-kinshasa-ecrivent-au-ministre-de-la-sante-publique-0  
 
2019). Consequently, state-building in the DRC has become an attractive, desirable project in the 
eyes of the West, manifesting in the aforementioned UN peacebuilding missions to the Congo 
that have discursively and ideologically linked the stabilization of the Congo to international 
security; preceding titles of these missions have included the United Nations Security and 
Stabilization and Support Strategy which became the International Security and Stabilization and 
Support Strategy “to reinforce political progress” (Barrera 2015). This paradigm of state-building 
in the Congo has been implemented to supposedly protect or help populations but also, and 
perhaps more so, to act as an ideological vehicle for Western ideals of peace and democracy, 
which are in many ways paradoxical to realities in the DRC. Some argue that because this 
paradigm is predicated on a dehistoricized narrative of the Congo as a “weak state” that needs to 
be strengthened, it fails to see how the Congolese state since its creation has been “patrimonial, 
clientelistic and predatory”, and thus preserves “the patrimonial and predatory method of 
governance employed in the Congo since it was first created by King Leopold II” (IA 2012: 48, 
cited in Barrera 2015).  
 Unresolved tensions between this state-building paradigm, which fails to address the 
primary causes of ongoing violence and underdevelopment, and humanitarian NGOs’ vertical, 
emergency-based intervention modalities have shaped the DRC’s fragmentary health system, and 
hindered assertions of statehood. Underlying these frictions is a lack of concurrence between 
these two parties on definitions of peace and state authority in the region: while the latter 
envisions peace beyond the simple cessation of hostilities and state authority as more than the 
presence of the army and state agents, representatives of the state seem to find these factors as 
adequate to achieve such goals. While acknowledging the importance of promoting longer-term 
development of the health system, which has been funded and pursued to an extent by donors 
 
and INGOs such as USAID, IRC, and Malteser, humanitarian actors tend to justify the 
continuance of their emergency-based vertical model because of the continuance of urgent and 
unmet civilian needs. While this bypassing of the state may contravene the principles of the 2005 
Paris Declaration which sets the framework for a consensus model of ‘country-led development’, 
and thus undermines state actors’ efforts to assert statehood, humanitarian actors continue with 
their work which in many ways is conducive to saving lives and improving community health 
(Aembe and Dijkzeul 2019). Humanitarian actors thus in some ways have inadvertently inserted 
themselves within what Kabamba (2012) views as “internal dynamics” in the DRC working to 
make the state, which he sees as the problem, as weak as possible, as opposed to the “external 
dynamics” supported by the UN and international community seeking to fortify it.  
The Ebola outbreak provides a helpful platform to study the impacts of these tensions 
between humanitarian actors and the Congolese state (and by extension the international 
community), the latter which could be argued has taken the riposte as an opportunity to perform 
state legitimacy. MSF and other NGOs’ in their commitment to delivering healthcare to those 
affected by Ebola have been considerably beset by the Congolese government’s militaristic 
approach to health and enforcement of anti-Ebola efforts, which has only exacerbated civilians’ 
distrust. Former response coordinator from the Congolese MoH Aruna Abedi was quoted saying 
“We tried community engagement. It doesn’t work. We need to use force”, while the declaration 
of the outbreak as an international health emergency in July 2019 provided the impetus for 
security forces to increase their involvement in the response in enforcing infection controls 
(Freudenthal). While maintaining strict policies against what they see as the “militarisation” of 
epidemic responses, and attempting to eschew visible interaction with military and police 
 
personnel to maintain an appearance of neutrality for civilians51, humanitarian actors have at 
times had to accept accompaniment by Congolese armed forces and police, and UN 
peacekeepers due to the high risk posed by armed groups, and at times, by civilians. These 
NGOs thus struggle to 1) avoid identity and ideological conflation with MONUSCO, a product 
in part of Western security concerns, and 2) reckon with the MoH’s problematic employment of 
state agents responsible in part for the predatory method of DRC’s governance, who comprise a 
response that reflects Western biosecurity concerns. 
Humanitarian Neutrality? Community Perceptions of MSF Amidst Ebola 
 Throughout the Ebola outbreak, attacks against MSF centres and armed group presence 
have led to the decisions of MSF teams to pull out of communities because of the threat posed to 
patients, staff, and the organization’s neutrality, which have undoubtedly had impacts on 
communities’ perceptions52. While perhaps unintentionally, MSF in its decisions to stop and 
remove operations in certain villages has reinforced in the eyes of local communities an 
imaginary divide between exceptional and non-exceptional violence: abandoning their posts due 
to violent attacks in villages where civilians face violence regularly, MSF transmits the message 
to civilians that the violence their team and patients faced was exceptional, thus implying that the 
quotidian violence faced by civilians from military forces and armed groups is unexceptional. In 
the eyes of civilians, these mechanisms of differentiating violence seem significant: considering 
 
51 Humanitarian actors alone have also faced difficulties in engaging with communities and earning their trust due to 
their usually foreign appearance and inescapable association with a global community that has long been indifferent 
to ongoing massacres and deprivations of basic needs in such populations; though they tend to bear more positive 
connotations than UN-affiliated personnel. 
52 https://www.msf.org/medical-activities-suspended-after-ebola-treatment-centre-attack 
   https://www.msf.org/msf-withdraws-staff-security-ebola-affected-biakato-deteriorates 
   https://www.msf.org/dr-congo-msf-stops-ebola-and-medical-care-due-military-presence 
   
 
 
that large portions of MSF’s staff are foreigners, evacuations of staff could be viewed as a way in 
which NGOs privilege the lives of (often white) foreigners over those of Africans. One MSF 
nurse indicated to the author the negative influence of evacuations of the organization’s staff on 
communities’ perceptions, by revealing the positive impact on such impressions of MSF’s 
decision to stay in communities despite security incidents (Personal interview 2). Overall, trust 
seems to vary according to whether or not humanitarian NGOs appear self-interested, which 
reflects in their decisions to stay or leave. 
One is also encouraged to think about how this particular epidemic has forced MSF to 
confront tensions between its commitment to political neutrality and its critique of the larger, 
global health governance structures that have contributed to the epidemic. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, MSF, one of the sole humanitarian actors present in the Eastern DRC, has published 
several reports over the years and recently, detailing the shocking conditions of the humanitarian 
crisis seen in the Eastern DRC, which have significantly contributed to the Ebola epidemic. Thus 
at the same time that they denounce the presence of armed groups in hospitals and medical 
settings and call for a neutral humanitarian aid that must be organized according to the real needs 
of the populations and not political motivation seen in state-building efforts, they have argued for 
lifting financial barriers to healthcare access in the region as well as improving vaccination 
coverage and the overall healthcare system to halt epidemics. In this way, MSF expresses its 
commitment to maintaining neutrality to get people the medical they need to survive, while also 
advancing a critique of the global neglect of this region which is symptomatic of the larger 
global health governance system53. As Nunes (2017) notes, MSF may need to contemplate how 
 
53 MSF has also taken political stances to advocate for health justice through for example its support of the Access 
Campaign, which contrasts with its insistence on being concerned primarily with getting immediate care to people 
who need it rather than with discussions about the IHR and international law (Nunes 13). 
 
its reluctance to assume an overtly political role has rendered it complicit in the “short-termist” 
approach prevalent in the global health agenda that can be implicated in the deplorable 
conditions in the provinces affected by Ebola (14). This complicity could be seen in the 
organization’s privileging of its mission of tending to the urgent needs of civilians and saving 
lives, and thus perpetuating its vertical, emergency intervention model, over supporting the 
Congolese state in its construction of a more comprehensive and sustainable healthcare system. 
As one public health official stated, “INGOs represent donors, and sometimes they trade on the 
fragility of the state and deploy in the sector of service provision with their own terms of 
reference”; he contrasted these INGOs with “respectful” ones who “align with state policy by 
integrating national health policy” (Aembe and Dijkzeul 2019). While MSF’s position in this 
distinction is unclear, Ebola has encouraged deeper engagement with such questions. 
Indeed, the Ebola outbreak could perhaps be read differently: not only as a situation that 
has revealed the problematic predatory and violent tendencies of the Congolese state, yet one 
that has surfaced the longstanding and unresolved tensions between INGOs and the state and the 
consequences of the disjuncture between their conceptions of peace and state authority in the 
Congo. As one MSF nurse shared with the author, the NGO has dedicated significant time and 
efforts to convincing populations that they are not associated with the armed forces, 
peacebuilding and political agendas (Personal interview 2); while understandably critical of how 
the state’s militarized approach to the response has eroded trust and compromised the Ebola 
riposte, this nurse’s sentiments could be indicative of attitudes held by MSF and other INGOs in 
the humanitarian sector, who have consistently refused to collaborate with the state in order to 
save lives (156). Perhaps one could think about how MSF’s decision to stop medical services in 
the name of impartiality and neutrality represents an assertion of its immunity from the situation 
 
unraveling in the Congo, and its occupying of a “higher ground” from the Congolese armed 
forces, and implicitly, the state whose agency and efforts to construct a more robust, public 
healthcare sector it indirectly works to undermine.  
Cultural Sensitivity or Human Sensitivity? Addressing Disjuncture Between Civilians and 
Response Personnel through Humanizing the Ebola Response in the DRC 
 
Nonetheless, despite these factors significantly complicating humanitarian actors’ 
reputations and abilities to gain trust in communities, certain NGOs such as MSF and ALIMA 
have shown the possibility of rebuilding trust and thus improving the response through 
developing several innovations informed by civilians’ concerns that have been integrated into the 
larger response. In this way, these organizations have proven how viewing and treating 
community members’ fears, apprehensions, and reluctance as rational rather than problematizing 
them through culturalist framings has helped cultivate more sustainable rapport with civilians. 
While cultural competence in this particular response has been a critical component of earning 
communities’ trust, such as through the implementation of safe and dignified burials (SDB), the 
particular histories and lived experiences of insecurity of affected populations in the eastern 
DRC reveal how some aspects of the Ebola response structure and protocols touch upon 
sensitivities that are inherently human. Innovations have brought to light legitimate fears held by 
civilians that tend to be overshadowed and invalidated in a response dominated by Western fears 
linked to Western biosecurity risks, and helped address disjuncture between healthcare delivery 
and affected civilians. 
An ALIMA employee working in Senegal at the time of interviewing emphasized how 
several innovations have been instrumental in humanizing the Ebola response, particularly in the 
areas of accessing treatment (Personal interview 4). The design and implementation of peripheral 
 
transit centres has been a way to integrate the Ebola response into existing healthcare structures: 
patients entering health centers at the village and city levels can be screened for a range of 
diseases including Ebola, thus de-isolating Ebola from other lethal diseases endemic in the 
region such as malaria that have been of longer-term and greater concern for local populations. 
Because of the proximity and familiarity of health centers for some locals, the peripheral transit 
center has the potential to decrease the prevalence of late arrivals at ETCs through earlier 
detection of Ebola; in turn, infected individuals’ trust can be established earlier in a place with 
which they are more accustomed, thus increasing the chances for earlier treatment and survival. 
This method of decentralizing the Ebola response has also been accompanied by the “transparent 
cubicle” innovation, which has helped allay civilians’ fears of the ETC; rendering the insides of 
the ETC isolation ward visible to those outside the centre came from ALIMA’s recognition of 
how locals’ apprehensions, present in this outbreak as well as in West Africa, represented a 
rational, human reaction to the act of severing loved ones from their sick kin having entered the 
ETC. Phasing out this structure’s opaque walls, which fueled suspicions of HCWs’ nefarious 
actions that were responsible for the deaths of patients, has helped increase trust from 
communities54. This change represents a positive step toward engendering a cycle of trust in 
ETCs, earlier presentation at them, and survival, thus helping decrease the spread of the disease. 
An MSF nurse working on-the-ground also stressed the positive impact that other strategies have 
had in promoting greater transparency: holding “Journées des portes ouvertes”55 at ETCs to 
allow community members to come and visit the ETC and meet response staff, while also 
 
54 One may also note striking historical parallels between these “innovations” and those reforms prompted by 
African “resistance” to the sleeping sickness campaign; in the Belgian colonial era, the system of lazarets, which 
similar to ETCs were labeled as “death camps”, became more decentralized, in closer proximity to villagers, while 
they were also less “prison-like”: these new centers could welcome patients’ immediate families, while patients with 
less advanced symptoms could be treated at injection clinics located closer to their homes, which arguable could be 
described as analogous to the peripheral transit centers discussed above (Lyons 126). 
55 Open houses 
 
injecting response personnel in front of communities to help decrease fear associated with the 
vaccine (Personal interview 2).  
Other practices popularized by ALIMA have also helped render treatment and 
engagement with response personnel less foreign and frightening through bringing the response 
closer to the community. The ALIMA employee underscored the positive impact that an on-
average 96% local staff has had in improving the sensitivities of the response team, decreasing 
language barriers as well as avoiding the immediate loss of trust in communities that the arrival 
of foreign response personnel can precipitate56. While not unique to this Ebola outbreak, the 
recruitment of survivors into the Ebola response has been instrumental in increasing trust in the 
eastern DRC: these individuals’ built-up immunity to the virus has allowed them to administer 
treatment to children and participate in care-giving routines without wearing the protective suit 
which bears alien-like connotations as health workers remain unrecognizable while wearing 
them, and associations with the ETC. This enlistment of survivors has importantly helped 
empower Ebola survivors in communities and decrease the stigmatization often brought against 
them, thus helping to mitigate some of the adverse psychological and psychosocial effects 
suffered by survivors post-Ebola; in turn, Ebola has become less foreign and more normalized 
within places affected by it, as communities come to recognize how their own members have 
endured this traumatic experience, and how the disease constitutes an important part of their 
history from which they have emerged resilient.  
“Endemic” Conflict and Endemic Ebola: Recommendations for Future Ebola Outbreaks in 
the Eastern DRC 
 
 
56 Recruiting predominantly from within the community also has the potential of decreasing suspicions of 
humanitarian organizations and foreign workers profiting from the response, especially since local staff are trusted 
more, while their employment can help contribute to village and city economies (Alcayna-Stevens 2018). 
 
 As a region whose instability shows no signs of abating anytime in the near future, where 
conflict has been described as “endemic” by one African scholar (Kabamba 2012), and where the 
risk of Ebola transmission remains high in a region where the disease has been referred to as 
“endemic”, attention must be given towards preparing for the next outbreak. The following 
recommendations are presented by the author, based on the presentation and analysis of the 
response structure and the various forms of “resistance” that the response elicited from 
communities affected by the outbreak. Some recommendations are inspired by interviewees and 
borrowed from other scholars in regards to previous Ebola outbreaks, and are referenced.  
● Prioritize community engagement from the start. 
○ As the outbreak comes to an end, organizations and the WHO begin to reflect on a 
fundamental mistake made at the outset of the outbreak and that certainly set the 
tone for the response: the non-inclusion of local voices. The confirmation of an 
Ebola case sounded the alarm for the international community and the DRC 
government, who in delving into emergency response mode neglected to 
remember critical lessons learned from the West Africa outbreak about how 
important listening to local perspectives is in developing an action plan that is 
sensitive to communities’ stated needs and priorities. Before the next outbreak 
occurs, considerable efforts should be made by NGOs and other researchers to 
communicate with populations affected by the outbreak and listen to what factors 
contributed to their mistrust. Regular public forums should be held that allow 
communities to surface their own ideas for community ownership of the response, 
how the response can better serve their priorities and needs, etc.  
○ A huge improvement from the West Africa outbreak seen in this response was the 
production and integration of social science data thanks to operational briefs made 
available through the SSHAP platform, and these research and collection 
processes should be mobilized from the very beginning of the outbreak. 
● Facilitate a more robust, multi-sectoral response through promoting dialogues between 
humanitarian NGOs, DRC MoH, and civil society actors to develop a single, national 
action plan for Ebola before the next outbreak occurs. 
○ A Mercy Corps worker on-the-ground in the DRC shared with the author that 
NGOs operating in the same villages/cities/areas should better communicate and 
coordinate their activities in order to avoid duplicating efforts, or transmitting 
mixed messages to communities (Personal interview 1). And as discussed earlier 
in the chapter, tensions persist between state actors’ desires for state authority and 
national health policy implementation and INGOs’ vertical intervention 
 
modalities that circumvent the state and undermine its authority. MSF was open 
in its disapproval of state strategies of using coercive tactics with populations to 
achieve compliance with anti-Ebola efforts. At the same time, neither the state nor 
humanitarian actors are best positioned to engage with communities to gain trust, 
but rather local structures such as religious associations and civil society 
organizations, who are well trusted by populations in the city of Goma and have 
provided health services in the past, as pointed out by David Peyton in an SSHAP 
brief (Mar 2019). Asad et al. (2014) suggest through their research on Partners in 
Health and Oxfam America how NGOs and their humanitarian projects are more 
likely to succeed when they adjust how they interact with the different types of 
states through engaging in processes of interest harmonization and negotiation. 
○ Before the next Ebola outbreak occurs, dialogues should be pursued between 
humanitarian actors such as MSF, ALIMA and the IRC, the MoH, and local 
structures such as the Protestant umbrella organizations Eglise du Christ au 
Congo (ECC), Communauté Evangélique au Centre de l'Afrique 
(CECA),Communauté des Eglises Baptistes du Congo (CEBCE), and Baraza 
Intercommunautaire, an interethnic organization specializing in dispute 
resolution, and Société Civile du Nord Kivu, an umbrella civil society 
organization. Including members of these local structures, as well as local 
Congolese HCWs/staff from the provinces affected by Ebola who worked with 
the WHO and with foreign humanitarian NGOs will facilitate greater 
representation of local perspectives in larger forums with national and 
international actors.  
○ These dialogues can consist of reflections on what went awry in this outbreak and 
how the response could be modified, especially to better earn communities’ trust, 
and lead to a single, national action plan for Ebola. Fingers should not all be 
pointed immediately at the MoH but rather focus on what failed as a team and 
how a more collective mindset can be cultivated going into the future. These more 
collective values fostered by a unified plan can be attractive for both the state and 
INGOs: they would help facilitate a more efficient Ebola response in which the 
state leverages its civil society actors and also develops relationships with INGOs 
that do not circumvent or undermine its national policies and authority, while 
these organizations’ strategies and visions are not rejected or eroded by 
militarization tactics. Conversations could include how to better differentiate tasks 
between NGOs, the state forces, and WHO: since MSF has a better reputation 
with civilians, especially after this outbreak, perhaps it should take on more 
community mobilization than the FARDC in order to not replicate the coercion 
from this outbreak. As a previous leader of MSF shared with the author, MSF and 
independent organizations must not cling to their autonomy and overly criticize 
other actors in a health emergency response, and better communicate and 
 
collaborate in order to achieve a more robust, coordinated response (Personal 
interview 5). 
● In pre-departure training as well as during field deployment, for foreign healthcare staff, 
INGOs should place a greater emphasis on sensitivity to the cultural as well as the 
historical and sociopolitical contexts of the outbreak environments, ideally through 
dialogues between foreign staff and community members from Eastern DRC.  
○ The Mercy Corps worker also revealed to the author that sensitization on cultural, 
historical, and sociopolitical contexts of outbreak environments receive cursory 
treatment in training organized by NGOs for foreign response teams before arrival 
in the outbreak zone (Personal interview 1). Considering the stigmatizing and 
critical attitudes demonstrated by response workers in this outbreak, as well as the 
dehistoricizing culturalist framings of the outbreak in media and elsewhere, 
training should devote significant time to the history of the country and especially 
the regional dynamics of violence, providing critical context on the alternative 
explanations often produced by populations. Pre-departure reading on the history 
and discussions about these topics should occur. In line with Kabamba’s (2012) 
critique of international workers arriving with the proper language and technical 
training but minimal-to-no historical awareness, readings could include works by 
Mudimbe (2008), Mamdani (1996), Mboloko (1995), and Ndaywel (1998). 
Similar training should continue during field deployment and consist of 
discussions on the readings mentioned as well as other forms of sensitization done 
by local staff and/or civil society actors. 
● Better define, measure and tabulate “community resistance” through funding the 
development of an actual methodology for studying the phenomenon and its impact on 
the response’s progression beyond simple observational or anecdotal methods.  
○ In line with Abramowitz’s (2017) observations of the lack of a proper 
methodology to examine “community resistance”, a phrase pervasive in 
humanitarian situation reports during the West Africa outbreak, this 
recommendation calls for funding and work to transform this concept into an 
empirically valid measure of the response’s success rather than a poorly defined 
term that perpetuates the idea that affected communities are intrinsically irrational 
and noncompliant. Anthropologists who were instrumental in gaining trust of 
local communities affected by Ebola in the DRC such as Julienne Anoko, and 
David Niabalamou, who also worked in the West Africa outbreak, could be 
contacted to pursue this methodological development.  
● Once in the Congo, INGOs should hold frequent trainings and debriefs focused on 
unpacking any “resistance” seen in communities and challenges in connecting with 
communities to combat stigma led by anthropologists and local civil society actors. 
○ In an emergency health response, various forms of “resistance” can become 
quickly problematized and time is not taken to reflect upon how histories and 
 
lived experiences of affected communities underpin alternative explanations. 
NGOs as well as the FARDC and all response teams should dedicate weekly 
meetings to the topic of community trust and messages emanating from 
communities. In particular, training should be implemented regularly which bring 
to response workers’ attention the types of actions, behaviors, and attitudes which 
could be stigmatizing and potentially worsen trust levels in communities.  
○ These trainings can be planned and led by anthropologists from the region or 
elsewhere in collaboration with a local civil society actor having strong rapport 
with the communities. Long-term funding should be established to pay for these 
individuals’ work in organizing and leading meetings, and also for their 
engagement with locals to gain their perspectives. 
● Organize public forums between youth and elder populations to promote dialogues 
surrounding the presence of foreign response teams and surface disagreements. 
○ A report reflecting on the Ebola outbreak in Equateur province that directly 
preceded the current one written by Alcayna-Stevens (2018) emphasized how 
youth in the DR tend to be more welcoming toward foreigners as they see them as 
helpful, and way to find employment, as opposed to elders who often reject 
foreign presence. The author recommended better harnessing the motivations of 
youth (those under 25), who comprise over 60% of the DRC’s population in 
subsequent Ebola responses. Youth should continue to be mobilized for Ebola 
awareness throughout the Eastern DRC, and encouraged to study and enter public 
health. More forums should be held between youth and elder populations in the 
region to facilitate dialogues between those who support foreign presence and 
those who do not, which could encourage elders to reflect more on the ways in 
which Ebola affects their and their families’ health. 
● Provide more transparent information about vaccine funding, and funding for the 
response overall, in local Swahili and through public forums. 
○ Much of the “resistance” to and alternative explanations surrounding the vaccine 
came from a dearth of information as to why so few people could get vaccinated 
(WHO had short supply and it was difficult to procure new supplies, many were 
experimental). Sensitization on the Ebola vaccine should be pursued currently as 
the outbreak seems to be dying down and before the next one hits, and 
information about who is eligible and how ring vaccination works should be made 
more comprehensible. Information on who supplies the vaccine, how much it 
costs, and who profits from it should be made publicly available. Reports on the 
previous Ebola response and who funded what entities and how much should be 
written up and/or translated into local Swahili so that civilians can access these 
reports digitally or via printed copies available in communities. 
● In line with the recommendations of Alcayna-Stevens (2018) in reference to the DRC’s 
9th Ebola outbreak, efforts should be made to subsidize healthcare for especially 
 
vulnerable populations (women, ethnic minorities), and establish long-term funding to 
train these populations as midwives, nurses and doctors. 
○ In the Eastern part of the country, conflict zones are common and produce many 
vulnerable populations, especially women, their children, and ethnic minorities 
who are targeted. While the Congolese state does in principle guarantee free 
healthcare in urgent cases, authorities in the East have proven incapable of 
holding to this commitment. The vast majority of the population lives on less than 
$2/day. A greater proportion of women than men in this Ebola outbreak died, 
likely due to roles of women as caregivers. 
○ This effort would be pursued over a longer period of time, and have several 
positive effects. Since large segments of the population in the Eastern DRC are 
barred from accessing the few healthcare facilities that do exist because of no 
health insurance, subsidized healthcare can help accustom individuals to the 
healthcare system and build more trust in it. This acclimation to the process of 
seeking out care would likely help cultivate a sense of trust amongst the 
population that would help decrease the potential for a resurgence of Ebola to 
elicit distrust and skepticism. Training these populations could also help empower 
them and mitigate economic inequalities that response can bring through 
recruiting those civilians who are already trained as nurses and doctors or better 
financially positioned and visible to response teams. 
● Hold regular forums between community members, representing a diverse array of 
professions, socioeconomic levels, gender, and ethnicity, and response personnel to 
discuss the response, not only after incidents occur. 
○ While public forums were established during the Ebola outbreak, this strategy 
should be continued and also made more regular. WHO situation reports seem to 
indicate that forums only took place on an ad hoc basis, after security incidents 
occurred, which had signaled the need to check in with communities. Instead, 
more regular public forums should be pursued between response personnel and 
communities, not only after violent episodes. More frequent conversations will 
make communities feel that their opinions and ideas matter and are wanted, and 
that their perspectives are not only appealed to after response workers’ lives or 
missions become threatened by insecurity, etc. MSF has shown how more 
frequent communication with communities and sharing of responsibilities in the 
design and erecting of ETCs and other aspects of the response, and thus trust in 
locals has facilitated more community ownership and been productive for 
response efforts, and these types of endeavors should be prioritized. 
● Establish funding to invest in research into the resilience, and local empiricism 
demonstrated by local communities in this outbreak to identify innovations and agency. 
○ As the first major Ebola epidemic where a vaccine and treatment were available 
and able to be administered to response workers and affected populations, 
 
unprecedented biomedical solutions could very well have obscured the realities of 
an underdeveloped healthcare system and lack of resources, as well as local forms 
of adaptation/coping. As access to populations was significantly hindered, many 
communities were left to respond without support of international or national 
responders. As Richards (2016) discusses, community mobilization in the West 
African outbreak was often predicated on an assumption that local communities 
possessed no knowledge or capacities to respond to Ebola, thus perpetuating their 
dependence on foreign teams, and reducing their agency. He and Abramowitz et 
al. (2015) also reveal how local knowledge was mobilized from the “bottom-up” 
and was more successful in containing Ebola than international response teams.  
○ The purpose of the research should not be to highlight local responses as 
necessarily ideal or desirable by communities, but rather as adaptations to a 
situation that saw the absence in many places of health, infrastructural and 
material supports (Abramowitz et al. 2015). Local perspectives can reveal the 
benefits as well as individual, social, and public health costs of local coping 


























Conclusion: Healing and Harming—Revisiting Colonial Legacies in the Eastern DRC and 
Recognizing “Patterns” Behind Mistrust in Epidemic 
Security, Exception, and Health in the Congo: Revisiting Colonial Legacies  
Returning to the enigmatic figure of Maria N’koi is helpful when seeking to historicize 
the links between security and “exception” in the Congolese socio-political landscape. She 
embodied what Hunt terms “therapeutic insurgency”, which weds the notion of medicinal 
healing with that of armed insurrection, health with liberation from oppressive, dehumanizing 
structures and systems such as colonialism. While continuing to wield an ability to incite others 
to armed rebellion even after her arrest, she herself became a “security risk” to the power of 
colonial officials and the dominance of the Belgian colonial state: she maintained “powers, 
patients, followers and spirits” which seemed to transcend the control of colonial officials, and 
thus “ignited colonial emergency” (Hunt 71, 72, and 61). In this case, the construction of 
“emergency” denoted the volatile state of rebelliousness inspired by N’koi observed by colonial 
agents throughout the colony, prompting them to “[declare] a state of exception” and stabilize 
the colonial order through relegating the healer (Hunt 92-3). Here, the declaration of emergency, 
a prerogative of the entity in a position of power, was deployed in response to a danger embodied 
by an elusive, mystical, and potent healer who, in the eyes of colonial officials, was 
fundamentally a subaltern body seeking to liberate herself and her people from subjugation. 
 Among the many consequences of white, colonial domination that N’koi spoke out 
against was the disproportionate number of African deaths due to sleeping sickness: this disease 
constituted a prolonged epidemic in Belgian colonial Congo and showcased the power of 
colonial officials to subjectively define, and in ways create, security risks, and the ensuing 
 
consequences. Nunes (2017) conveys the relationship between power and security through 
capturing the inventiveness of the latter:  
“...‘security’ is not a description of reality but a tool for shaping reality...The 
notion of securitization helps to explain the current tendency to use security to 
make sense of events...and the resulting ability to create or expand areas of 
exception where normal rules do not apply” (5).     
 
Security thus becomes a way to alter the optics through which a certain situation like an 
epidemic is viewed, which in turn justifies a departure from normalcy to respond to it. In the 
early 1900s, the campaign to end sleeping sickness in the colonies was elaborated upon the 
predominant conception of disease as an “enemy agent”, rendering the battle against it a 
“‘struggle’, which would require all the logistics and strategy of a military campaign” (Lyons 
103). The consequences of this discursive framing of the response to the epidemic fell heavily on 
“African societies...who had to be controlled for their own protection” (Lyons 104). Yet this 
seemingly benevolent mission to “protect” the health of Africans cannot be removed from a 
context of Belgium’s “civilizing” mission in the Congo, where the Belgian colonial medical 
service was deployed “as a form of ‘constructive imperialism’”, and where Belgians had an 
economic incentive to save African lives to preserve manual labour (Lyons 64). And despite the 
demonstrated aetiology of the disease, infection through contact with the disease’s primary 
vectors, tsetse flies, the Belgians’ campaign targeted man, and predominantly, Africans for 
“sterilisation” of the parasite, reinforcing associations between the disease, security, and the 
African, subaltern body. Consequently, “disease, like the recalcitrant Africans, would be forced 
into submission”, justifying strict policing of Africans, restrictions of their social and economic 
activities and movements, and harsh conditions in the cordons sanitaires  (Lyons 103).  
 While the Belgian sleeping sickness campaign’s intensive focus on controlling African 
movements ultimately led to an effective containment of the disease, its biomedical ethos should 
 
be analyzed for the ways in which it bolstered colonial state power and justified violence 
throughout the imperial and colonial eras. According to Lyons (1992), the sleeping sickness 
campaign initiated a “medicalisation of the Congolese”, where the Belgians sought to instill in 
colonized Africans the idea that European doctors and their medications were the sole and 
unquestionable solutions to problems of ill health (102). Lauding and entrenching this 
biomedical model to treat a disease whose propagation originated at the nexus of social, 
economic and environmental factors, the Belgians further cemented an optics through which they 
came to diagnose the physical and psychological effects of colonialism detached from the 
colonial condition. In the 1930s, in a colonial research investigation into the depopulation trend 
observed in the Congo region of Tshuapa, Dr. Georges Schwers “[underlined] sterility as 
inherent in the ‘race’ and as resulting from ‘primitive’, ‘primordial’ shock” (Hunt 147).While 
with this notion of shock Schwers acknowledged how early colonial occupation served as a 
profound disturbance that weakened familial spirit and maternal instinct, he overall spoke in “an 
abstract, dehistoricized language, not in structural terms about harm” (Hunt 147). Schwers’ 
language that described the trauma and weakness of the Africans in Tshuapa referred to a 
nonspecific previous time of shock, failing to mention and implicate imperial and colonial 
violence, and reducing the scope of his research field to the medicalized, human body (Hunt 
156).  
Overall, Schwers conveyed and preserved a pathologizing and dehistoricizing 
degeneration of the African body in Belgian and European medical circles that helped silence 
past colonial violence, a narrative that could help illuminate discourse on the Congolese state 
today. As Hunt (2016) writes, citing Daniel Picks, “joining ideas about a social body—a nation, 
a race—with fears about skin color, respectability, and birth rate, degenerationist language tends 
 
to combine ‘a technical diagnosis and a racial prophecy’” (147). Deployed as an intentional, 
destructive tool, this degenerationist language justified colonial conquest through affirming the 
inexorability of the African’s decline, and even extinction, because of their inherent weakness 
faced with a superior (white) race. One could argue the same power structures that shaped this 
resulting lens through which colonial powers viewed and diagnosed their colonized subjects 
operates today in discourse pervading the international community that conveys the DRC as a 
“weak state”. Described by such institutions like the World Bank as a “state...characterized as 
being in an ‘advanced state of degradation’, and as a “destabilizing factor for its nine 
neighboring countries”, the Congo in mostly Western understandings continues to be presented 
through language and meanings that pathologize its conditions and existence, which threaten to 
infect nearby nations and the world, detached from the violence that has defined its history since 
its creation (World Bank 2013, p. 3, cited in Aembe and Dijkzeul 2019). And the consequences 
of these remnants of degenerationist discourse are far from benign: for the DRC, as a weak and 
fragile state, the only alternative in the West’s eyes becomes strengthening and stabilizing it, 
through “extending the authority of a predatory state” and thus “replacing one group of 
perpetrators (foreign and Congolese rebel groups) with another (state authorities and state 
security forces)” (Autesserre 2012). And civilians, especially in the country’s war-torn east 
where UN peacekeeping operations persist, who are currently affected by Ebola, are harmed the 
most from continual violence that in their eyes, and that in truth, reflect in several ways legacies 
of the violence and perturbations intrinsic to colonialism. 
 It is with this particular history of the Congo, which as illustrated very much lives in the 
present, that one must read the “resistance” of civilian populations in the eastern Congo in 
reaction to Ebola and the (inter)national response, and grasp the complex ways in which Western 
 
biomedicine, security, and power intersect. Fanon’s reminders of the anger and ambivalence 
produced by biomedicine in colonial and postcolonial contexts, seminal in the field of decolonial 
thinking, encourages one to combat depictions of acts of “resistance” amidst Ebola in the eastern 
DRC that center on individuals’ “beliefs” and “ignorance”, attributing these negative reactions of 
civilians to an African culture that is implicitly inferiorized to that of the West and biomedicine 
(Hunt 164). What should not be mistaken for a cultural incongruence between Congolese 
populations affected by Ebola and biomedical approaches to anti-Ebola measures is rather a 
friction between protected response workers’ senses of health and physical insecurity and 
affected populations’ lived experiences of chronic physical, health, and economic insecurity. 
What have converged are different optics through which Ebola and its presence are viewed: 
while on the response side those optics are sculpted to exceptionalize Ebola as a formidable 
biosecurity threat, those on the receiving end look through a lens in which Ebola simply adds a 
dimension of precariousness, that poses no “extraordinary” threat out of the overall insecurity 
that envelops their lives.  
One cannot help but see parallels with the colonial state of emergency declared in 
response to N’koi: the state and international community, entities retaining greater power, and 
importantly, employing violence, continue exercising the paternalistic power to declare what is 
exceptional, what constitutes emergency, prompted by a risk that poses a threat to them that 
should in turn receive priority rather than the threats faced by affected communities that have 
been met with silence for years. The Mercy Corps worker who spoke with the author presented 
this trend as a symptom of the West’s tendency to arbitrarily impose urgency on all that is Ebola; 
the resulting disconnect with reality reflects in decisions that, “nonsensically”, created urgency in 
an outbreak with 10x fewer people touched by Ebola than in West Africa (Interview 1). 
 
 In the same way that Ebola should not be framed as a “substantial”, “unexpected”, 
“unusual” event, as its labels as a Class 3 emergency and PHEIC denote, the various forms of 
“resistance” to the riposte from local populations in the affected provinces, and importantly the 
messages they transmit, should equally not be viewed as anomalous, thus not meriting attention 
or recognition. Benton (2016) advocates an understanding of attacks on healthcare workers that 
is not “exceptional”, but rather placed “within their broader social, political and cultural 
contexts”57 (158). This enlarged perspective that helps combat a narrow analysis of events, 
analogous to how an ecological model resists a biomedical examination of public health issues, 
reveals the complex, profound nature of acts of “resistance”, and alternative explanations 
produced by communities affected by Ebola that evidence their agency in conditions that have 
long silenced their voices, and their suffering, since imperial times. N’koi, a figure who inspired 
unrest, was outspoken about sleeping sickness as a colonial tool of extermination against African 
populations, a message that surely resonated with other Africans for whom disease became 
viewed as a form of biowarfare used by colonial agents. Observing how this same type of optic 
through which the presence of disease is viewed has recurred with Ebola demonstrates how 
violent realities have evolved yet in ways remained unchanged for many throughout history, and 
how some Congolese have offered an alternative biosecurity narrative to that of the West that 
views disease as an element difficult to dissociate from politics and history. While by no means 
representative of all individuals’ opinions in regions affected by Ebola, and while sometimes 
mobilized to achieve unscrupulous political ends, alternative explanations like that of Ebola as a 
 
57 As one Nigerian national shared with the author, the political nature of interventions in health crises, in which 
humanitarian, neutral NGOs participate, is irrefutable, and also inevitable (Interview 6). In this way, these 
independent, impartial actors must not see themselves as immune from criticism against the political dimension of 
their actions, and the impossibility of compartmentalizing spaces occupied by humanitarian actors and the 
politicized milieux in which they operate. 
 
tool of warfare and extermination join with others that nonetheless provide a powerful 
commentary on the consequences of global neglect and inaction.  
From Ebola to Covid-19: Recognizing “Patterns” Behind Mistrust in Epidemics 
As Ebola in the DRC, as well as other epidemics and pandemics such as Covid-19 have 
demonstrated, disease outbreaks can be mobilized as attempts to shape the optics through which 
those lacking power interpret their political and social realities. As previously discussed, local 
elites in the Kivus and Ituri Provinces have capitalized on the deep-seated mistrust of civilians in 
this region of the DRC through propounding Ebola bioweapon narratives to secure their own 
political support, prolonging the outbreak to enrich themselves. Other manipulative tactics such 
as framing Ebola as a hoax seen in the DRC’s tenth outbreak and West Africa seem to parallel 
ones which have emerged during the Covid-19 pandemic. Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia 
has previously denounced social media and news reports on coronavirus as “fake news”, and 
used this anti-propaganda façade to jail opposition leaders as well as civilians who have 
expressed concerns about the disease58. In the UK and the US, various conspiracy theories have 
sprung out from right-wing extremist groups, making such claims that Covid-19 is linked with 
5G technology59, and that coronavirus was concocted in a Chinese lab and released as a 
bioweapon. The Chinese state has reciprocated this bioweapon trope and utilized its tight control 
of media to obscure its own alleged inaction in the face of mounting coronavirus cases, and use 
the epidemic as an opportunity for nationalist performance (Zhou et al. 2020). In response to the 
crisis of confidence in Xi Jinping’s leadership, Chinese state media turned conspiratorial chatter 
found in the recesses of the internet into official state propaganda: rather than accept perceptions 
 
58 https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/24/cambodia-covid-19-clampdown-free-speech  
59 https://www.bbc.com/news/52168096  
 
of himself as a leader who knowingly ignored a growing threat to his nation’s people, Jinping 
and his communist state have deployed a narrative that depicts him as the defender of his people 
from the US and their bioweapon, coronavirus. This self-inflating tactic that makes use of 
conspiracies lauds the Chinese state for bringing order namely through strong leadership and 
scientific innovation, the latter of which in China is often seen as a panacea to complex social 
ills60 (Zhou et al. 2020). 
The aforementioned narratives can be aptly labeled conspiracy theories, whose intentions 
often aimed at distorting reality to achieve some political gain are to be distinguished from those 
alternative explanations produced by historically marginalized peoples amidst epidemics. 
Providing comfort to individuals who find an explanation for and source of this pathogen with 
catastrophic power that is both “motiveless and meaningless”, conspiracy theories correspond to 
what Stuttaford describes as “a susceptibility to finding patterns where none exist.” As 
inventions, these narratives are utilized as tools to seemingly create order from what is inherently 
disorder, and also distract from underlying structural issues that events such as epidemics and 
pandemics reveal in society, and the world. While many of the alternative explanations given by 
Congolese civilians during the most recent Ebola outbreak, other civilians during the West 
Africa outbreak, and others in disease outbreaks throughout human history are given the label of 
 
60 State media posts presenting the “construction miracle” of new hospitals in China as a patriotic engineering feat 
rather than evidence of an overburdened medical system provides an idea of this reality (DiResta 2020).  Here one 
should recognize how in wealthier countries such as China, and Western ones such as the U.S. and U.K., bioweapon 
narratives can be deployed selectively in order to promote self-inflating tactics that also impose blame on poorer 
countries amidst health crises. While during Ebola and Covid-19, media reports have been known to link the 
devastation wreaked by such diseases in poorer countries such as in Africa with mismanagement of funds, poor 
hygiene, failing institutional structures and the dangers of misinformation, the severe consequences faced by 
wealthier countries are depicted as something beyond their control (a bioweapon attack as a case-in-point). If 
anything, the intractability and great damage caused by Covid-19 in low-, middle-, and high-income countries alike 
requires an interrogation of the responsibilities of leaders of various countries in the inequality and unpreparedness 
that the pandemic has revealed, all while acknowledging the vulnerability of poorer countries with under-developed 
health infrastructures. 
 
“conspiracy theories”, this thesis, and the work of other scholars such as Alcayna-Stevens (2020) 
demonstrate the inaccuracy of this term. The world’s and societies’ most vulnerable and 
marginalized, often disproportionately impacted by epidemics, have produced themselves 
narratives to explain epidemics and their ensuing responses in ways that in fact recognize and 
respond to the patterns of control, silencing, and oppression of their own bodies and voices.   
The history of “resistance” to cholera outbreak responses provides a helpful illustration of 
the importance of situating negative and sometimes violent reactions of certain populations into 
the historical, sociopolitical patterns to which they are well-accustomed. During the second 
pandemic of cholera, a water-borne illness primarily affecting urban slums, that struck Russia in 
1830, rumors arose from those cholera victims who were indiscriminately thrown together with 
those suffering from other ailments that doctors were intentionally seeking to exterminate the 
sick; doctors and government officials thus became the targets of repeated, violent cholera riots, 
transpiring in subsequent outbreaks such as the fifth in what is currently the Ukrainian city of 
Donetsk, creating reinforcing government repression and unrest that ultimately led to the Russian 
Revolution. After the disease broke out in Haiti in October 2010, rumors began to circulate, 
fueling riots, and positing UN peacekeeping troops as the source of the outbreak, which later 
turned out to be true (Kolbert). While these explanations for cholera may on-the-surface seem as 
fantastical as those conspiracy theories delineated above, they must not be removed from the 
historical, social, and political contexts of those who proposed and propagated them. Reactions 
of second-class citizens mistreated by doctors and government officials during the earlier cholera 
outbreaks deserve a reading as responses to the harsh treatment as well as adverse socioeconomic 
conditions that the epidemic had magnified and importantly brought to society’s attention. In 
Haiti, seemingly far-fetched “rumors” that implicated a Western security force may make more 
 
sense when placed into a history in which the Haitian people have been historically marginalized 
and harmed by the foreigner: forcibly removed from their homes in Africa by the white 
Europeans, enslaved by them, indebted to them, and perpetually intervened by them and the US.  
 Epidemics can generate an abundance of narratives to explain them, that oftentimes 
convey distrust and suspicion, deviate from the truth and produce behaviors and sometimes 
violence that can be counter-productive for public health measures; however sensitivity to the 
positionality of who is advancing such narratives, who is exhibiting such distrust, must be 
integrated into efforts to address them, providing a critically more complex understanding of the 
historical and sociopolitical landscapes against which epidemics and their responses emerge and 
evolve. Epidemics and their responses can give a voice and opportunity to a wide range of actors 
that occupy their own unique spaces within a larger, common one that can transcend communal, 
regional, and national borders. During epidemics those with specific political agendas can 
advance narratives that they strategically construct to resonate with marginalized peoples, and 
often to keep them in their inferior and subdued positions; yet epidemics showcase how these 
disadvantaged, oppressed peoples, oftentimes those who are disproportionately harmed by health 
cries, so too can speak up and transmit messages that resonate with each other. In epidemic and 
pandemic responses now and in the future, the first priority should be not rejecting both of them, 
but rather listening carefully to them and discerning between the two. This combination of 
listening and patience must comprise any attempt toward working with communities to heal what 







« En 20 ans, avec les drones, les lunettes à vison nocturne, les autos blindées, les avions, les 
milliards et tous le matos etc... comment les casques bleus n’arrivent pas à ‘attraper la souris’ 
?????? » Kash Thembo, November 24, 2019 (Source: Alcayna-Stevens 2020) 
Here, UN peacekeepers ask themselves why civilians are so upset, because they “didn’t do 
anything”. Civilians shrewdly respond, “exactly, you don’t do anything here,” as they chant in 












The map indicates outbreaks of Ebola in Yambuku in 1976, Tandala in 1977, Kikwit in 
1995, Mweka in 2007, Luebo in 2008, Isiro in 2012, Tshuapa in 2014, and, at the time of 
the map’s creation, in Likati in 2017. All outbreaks were of the Ebola Zaire subtype, 
except for the Isiro outbreak, with Ebola Bundibugyo. All outbreaks of Ebola Zaire were 

















Map showing health zones previously affected by Ebola or affected by the 
disease at the time of the map’s creation on February 20, 2020 (Source: DRC 











A poster distributed after the attack on the Katwa ETC on February 24, 2019 
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